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A Charitable Corporate Giving
Justification for the Socially Responsible
Investment of Pension Funds: A Populist
Argument for the Public Use of Private
Wealth
Edward S. Adams*
KarlD. Knutsen**
As men intermingle and conditions become more equal, the
resources, education and desires of the poor increase. The poor
man gets the idea that he can improve his lot and tries to do so
by saving. So daily savings create an infinite number of small
capital accumulations, the slow fruit of patient labor. These
savings are always increasing, but the greater part thereof would
remain unproductive as if it were still scattered. This has led to
the creation of a philanthropic institution which will, if I am not
mistaken, soon become one of the most important political
institutions. Charitable men thought of the idea of collecting the
poor man's savings and turning them to profitable use.'
Paul and Patricia Cooper are a married couple living in Chicago. Paul
is a union worker at Ryerson Steel Company and Patricia is a commercial

loan officer at First Chicago Bank. The Coopers recycle papers, cans, and
bottles. They buy products such as Ben and Jerry's ice cream because they
like the idea of supporting family farmers. The Coopers also make yearly
charitable contributions to the American Cancer Society in memory of
Paul's mother who died of cancer.
The Coopers both have generous employer-administered pension
plans to which they contribute the maximum allowable amount. When the
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School, 1988.
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We would like to thank John E. Schultz, Stephen S. Dunham, and the Honorable
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1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 682 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., Anchor Books 1966) (1840).
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Coopers see the annual pension summaries provided by their employers,
they happily note that their respective pension plans hold much more
money than their joint bank account. When the Coopers look more closely
at the summaries, however, they notice something troubling. Their pension
funds hold the stock of Phillip Morris, a cigarette manufacturer, and Lasser
Electronics, a company that habitually has dosed unionized American
plants and set up nonunion shops in South America. The Coopers are
livid. Why, they ask, give to the American Cancer Society when their
pension funds own stock in a company that seeks to increase cigarette
consumption? Why, they insist, should they invest their retirement savings
in a company that may buy Paul's company, fire him, and move his
manufacturing job to South America? The Coopers' situation is not
unique. Like many Americans, the Coopers are beneficiaries of pension
funds that hold shares of corporations the beneficiaries do not like and
with which they would prefer not to associate.
Pension funds represent the largest pool of investment capital in the
world.2 In 1987, pension fund assets totaled approximately $1.6 trillion s
By 1989, this figure had grown to $2.6 trillion4 and by 1990, with total
assets of $2.7 trillion, corporate pension funds equalled nearly one-half of
America's $5.6 trillion Gross National Product.5 In 1991, pension funds
owned approximately sixty percent of all "Standard & Poors 500" stock s
and about fifty percent of all publicly quoted American shares.' This
substantial growth will likely continue as the "baby-boom" generation ages
and saves for retirement. By the year 2000, pension fund assets could

2. Larry light, The Power of the Pension Funds, Bus. Wk., Nov. 6, 1989, at 154.
3. J. Robert Suffoletta, Jr., Note, Who Should Pay When Federally Insured Pension
Funds Go Broke?: A Strategy for Recovering from the Wrongdoers, 65 Notre Dame L Rev.
308, 312 (1990) (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Effect of the 1987 Stock Market Decline
on Selected Large Pension Plans 2 (1988)).
4. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs:
Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1425, 1478 (1991) (citing
Light, supra note 2, at 155).
5. Barry B. Burr, Brazil Changing Its Ways; Government, Groups Face Off on Pension
Reforms Issues, Pensions & Investments, Mar. 10, 1992, at 21.
6. Matheson & Olson, supra note 4, at 1478 (citing Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E.
Korens, Institutional Shareholder Activism and Related Proposals for Legislative and
Regulatory Changes to Corporate Governance Rules, in Proxy Contests, Institutional Investor
Initiatives, Management Responses 1990, at 621, 623-24 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 696, 1990)).
7. Roberta S. Karmel, The Fourth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: Tensions Between
Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: An International Perspective: Is It Time for a
Federal Corporation Law?, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 55, 68 (1991) (citing A Word with Your Owners,
Economist, Jan. 12, 1991, at 17). In 1960, institutional investors held only 10-15% of all U.S.
equity holdings. By 1990, they held 50.5% of all US. equities. In 1993, however, institutional
holdings of U.S. equities declined to 46.8%. Leslie Scism, Institutional Share of U.S. Equities
Slips, Wall St.J., Dec. 8, 1993, at Cl. The Wall StreetJournal further reported that the relative
decline of institutional holdings is due not to an actual decline in the amount of institutional
holdings, but rather to an increase in the holdings of small investors--perhaps due to lower
Interest rates in 1993. Id.
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conceivably reach $4 trillion.8

The entity or party charged with managing pension funds has a
fiduciary duty to act as if it were making investment decisions for itself.
Ordinarily, this means that the fiduciary considers only economic criteria
in order to maximize returns and increase the fund's total assets. If the
fund manager chooses to engage in "socially responsible investing,"9 by
contrast; the manager considers noneconomic criteria in making
investment choices. In such an instance, the socially responsible investor
uses some combination of negative and positive "screens"10 to implement
the fund's investment strategy in accordance with a broader social,
political, or normative framework."
8. Suffoletta, supra note 3, at 312 (citing John Cony, NBC Looks at Power of the
Pension Funds, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1985, at A46).
9. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79
Mich. L. Rev. 72, 73 (1980). Professors Langbein and Posner's article is the seminal work in
this area; this Article generally adopts both their definitions and methodology. Nonetheless,
their use of the term "social investing" is problematic. See id. at 73 (implying that those who
consider only economic criteria are simply "investing"). The use of the adverb "social" to
modify the verb "invest" is curious. One would, after all, distinguish someone who drives
poorly from someone who drives safely by calling the poor driver "reckless" and not by calling
the safe driver "virtuous," "careful," or "skillful." This usage stems from the belief that
responsibility is the norm and that it sometimes requires people to act in ways superior to the
minimum standards for social behavior set by criminal law. In the case of socially responsible
investments and pension funds, however, the prevailing language requires modification of the
word "invest" with an adverb suggestive of the complexities of the concept Because this
Article suggests that investing has implications and that investing with an eye towards
noneconomic goals may be desirable, it will use the term "socially responsible investing."
10. Id. at 83; Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing- Doing Good Versus
Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1992); se also Peter D. Kinder,
Social Investing's Strength Lies in Readiness to Deal with World's Tough Questions, Pension
World, Apr. 1993, at 10 (stating that a "social screen" systematically incorporates "ethical
values and objectives into the investment decision-making process").
Professors Langbein and Posner suggested that a socially responsible investment strategy
must include both positive and negative screens. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 73. This
suggestion is troublesome. An investor might wish to exclude a single security from a portfolio
based upon any number of considerations. Relying on modern portfolio theory (MPT), which
operates on the premise that one can minimize overall portfolio risk by carefully selecting a
large number of stocks with varying degrees of risk, Professors Langbein and Posner also
argued that market analysis is not economically worthwhile and an investor should prefer a
portfolio that mirrors the market as a whole and minimizes nonmarket fluctuation. Id. at 8283.
If, as Professors Langbein and Posner assumed, the efficient market manages risk, one
interesting implication is that the exclusion of a single security, or even a small number of
securities, for example, may actually have no appreciable effect upon portfolio performance.
See infra note 28 (discussing Langbein and Posner's suggestion of a trade-off between profit
maximization and socially responsible investing). While Professors Langbein and Posner
asserted that excluding even a small number of securities will have negative implications for a
portfolio's long-term profitability because of market fluctuation, they ignored the normative
question of whether the added risk is worth the benefit of the socially responsible exclusion.
This Article briefly places this normative issue in a historical context in its discussion of
charitable corporate giving.
11. Troy Segal, PuttingYour Cash Where Your Conscience Is, Bus. Wk., Dec. 24, 1990, at
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When an investor uses a negative screen, the investor excludes the
securities of an otherwise economically attractive organization because of
normative considerations. 12 For example, an investor employing negative
screens might decide not to invest in corporations with poor labor 5 or
environmental records;1 4 companies that produce products the investor
finds objectionable, like beef,15 munitions,16 alcohol, or tobacco; or
corporations doing business in particular countries such as South Africa7

74, 75. Over the past 80 years, socially responsible investing has "evolved from simple
exclusionary policies to highly nuanced evaluations of corporate behavior." Kinder, supra note
10, at 10. Socially responsible investing has recently spawned literature advising readers of

different ways in which they might invest in a socially responsible manner. See generaly Jack
Brill & Alan Reder, Investing from the Heart: The Guide to Socially Responsible Investments
and Money Management (1991); Larry Burkett, Investing for the Future (1992); John C.
Harrington, Investing with Your Conscience: How to Achieve High Returns Using Socially
Responsible Investing (1992); ElizabethJudd, Investing with a Social Conscience (1990); Peter
D. Kinder et al., The Social Investment Almanac: A Comprehensive Guide to Socially
Responsible Investing (1992); Ritchie P. Lowry, Good Money. A Guide to Profitable Social
Investing in the '90s (1991); Steven D. Lydenberg et al., Rating America's Corporate
Conscience (1992); Milton Moskovitz et al, Everybody's Business (1992).
12. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 73; Segal, supra note 11, at 74-75.
13. See, e.g., Laura Walbert, Investing Clean and Green, Working Woman, Dec. 1992, at
62, 62 (discussing "ethical" mutual funds that do not invest in securities of corporations
known to treat their employees unfavorably); see also Mark Dowie, Clean, Green and Guilt
Free Funds, The Nation, Apr. 26, 1993, at 550, 551 (suggesting that investors avoid investing
in corporations which exploit labor unions and discriminate against particular groups). The
Women's Equity Mutual Fund For Investment cites ten companies that treat their female
employees better than most other companies. Susan Antilla, "Woman-Friendly" Fund Hits First
Hitch, Deny. Post, Oct 18, 1993, at 3E.Among others, the Fund cites Avon, Advanced Tissue
Technologies, Gannett, and Federal National Mortgage for having women among the highest
paid employees; Piper-affiray and Scholastic for having a high percentage of women
managers; and Unum for running innovative family programs. Id. These ramkings, however,
have encountered criticism from those who disagree with their methodology. Id.
14. See, eg., Coalition For Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), The 1990
Ceres Guide to the Valdez Principles 7-10 (stating 10 principles by which investors can
evaluate corporate activities that affect the environment); John J. Cohrssen & Vincent T.
Covello, Risk Analysis: A Guide to Principles and Methods for Analyzing Health and
Environmental Risk 55-94 (1989) (providing a method of analysis to assess the risk posed by a
particular environmental hazard); Laura L. Castro, A Matter of Principle: Companies and
Environmental Awareness, Newsday, Sept. 8, 1989, at 47 (discussing the Valdez principles, 10
standards by which to judge the environmental responsibility of corporations); Kelley Holland,
A Play for Tree-Huggers, Bus. Wk., Mar. 29, 1993, at 100, 100 (discussing mutual funds which
attract environmentally conscious investors); Matthew L. Wald, Exxon Head Seeks
Environmentalist to Serve on Board: Pension Fund Pressure, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, at Al
(discussing the impact of institutional investors in influencing Exxon policy).
15. See, e.g.,Jeremy Rifkin, Beyond Beef. The Rise and Fall of the Cattle Culture (1992).
16. International financier George Soros recently announced that he had sold his 6%
interest in Alliant Techsystems, Inc., a manufacturer of tank ammunition, duster bombs, and
land mines. Soros Sells His Stock in Munitions Maker Alliant Tech Systems, Wall St. J., Mar.
28, 1994, at A9C In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Mr. Soros noted
that the investment was not compatible with his philanthropic and humanitarian activities. Id.
17. For a discussion of South African divestments, see generally Joel C. Dobris,
Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of "South African" Securities, 65 Neb. L Rev. 209
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or the former Yugoslavia.
Investors can also use positive screens to encourage behavior they find
socially desirable.' By employing a positive screen, the investor includes
securities in a portfolio that the investor would not select when relying
only upon economic considerations. An investor using positive screens may
9
decide to invest, for example, in minority-owned business enterprises,
2
community economic development organizations, ' organizations that
or corporations that make charitable
develop low-cost housing,'
contributions to the community.
Positive screens, although more restrictive than negative screens, are
likely to have a greater impact in effecting socially desirable behavior.
Investing in a local development company, for example, will have a more
direct and therefore greater impact on the community or country than
*deciding not to invest in a corporation operating in a particular country.
On the other hand, by restricting the universe of companies in which the
2
fund can invest, negative screens may invite more portfolio fluctuation. 2
Traditionally, courts and commentators have held that the fiduciary
duty of pension fund managers to maximize profits precludes them from
investing in a socially responsible manner. 23 Recently, however,
commentators have begun to question the proposition that pension fund
trustees cannot accept reasonable financial sacrifices based upon
noneconomic considerations.2 4 As one commentator noted, a pension

(1986); Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local
Divestment Legislation, 61 Tul. L Rev. 469 (1987); Thomas A. Troyer et al., Divestment of
South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable
Institutions, and Pension Funds, 74 Geo. UJ. 127 (1985); South Africa-Free Portfolios Don't
Suffer, Pensions & Investment Age, Oct. 16, 1989, at 40.
18. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 73.
19. See, eg., Earl G. Graves, Valuing Our Stock; Investing in African-American Businesses,
Black Enter., May 1992, at 9 (encouraging African-Americans to invest in African-American
owned businesses).
20. Se4 e.g., Funds Put Assets in Social Investments, Pensions & Investments, July 6, 1992,
at 33. The Board of Pensions for the mainline Protestant Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America (ELCA) recently placed $300,000 of its $2.3 billion portfolio in three social purpose
funds which target community and economic development projects. The Board of Pensions
has committed an additional $2 million to another fund. As Governor of Arkansas, Bill
Clinton also sought to use state pension funds to target state economic development.
Christine Philip, Governor Clinton Sought In-State Investments, Pensions & Investments, Feb.
22, 1993, at 32.
21. Se4 e.g., Dowie, supra note 13, at 551 (discussing the origins of the social-investment
movement as a small yet useful source of finance capital for progressive economic endeavors
such as construction of low-cost housing); Ellen James Martin, Social Investing's 1990s Spin,
Institutional Investor, Mar. 1993, at 155 (discussing pension fund investments in socially
targeted real estate).
22. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 73-74 (defining social investing and
introducing the economic implications of selecting a variety of stocks in accordance with
social objectives); Segal, supra note 11, at 35-37 (discussing social investing and providing
examples of economic results of diverse socially responsible funds).
23. Seeinfra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
24.
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fund trustee should have the authority to make reasonable attempts at
helping the community just as a director of a corporation can make
reasonable charitable contributions.2
Expanding upon these developments, this Article proposes a novel
justification for the socially responsible investment of pension funds based
26
upon traditional principles of charitable corporate giving and populism.

The directors of a business corporation owe fiduciary duties to the
shareholders to conduct the business of the corporation so as to attempt to secure a
profit. But it is well settled that they should recognize that they and the corporation
are a part of the community. They may, within proper limits, make gifts of the
money of the corporation for charitable purposes, although this may, for the
Immediate present at least, slightly diminish the profits of the corporation....
A corporation and its directors in the conduct of its business should be aware
of its social responsibilities. They should refrain from doing harm to the community,
even though there would not be a violation of law in causing such harm, and even
though there might be a diminution of immediate profits...
Trustees in deciding
whether to invest in, or to retain, the securities of a corporation may properly
consider the social performance of the corporation. They may dedine to invest in, or
to retain, the securities of corporations whose activities or some of them are contrary
to fundamental and generally accepted ethical principles. They may consider such
matters as pollution, race discrimination, fair employment, and consumer
responsibility.
... Of course they may well believe that a corporation that has a proper sense
of social obligation is more likely to be successful in the long run than those that are
bent upon obtaining the maximum amount of profits. But even if this were not so,
the investor, though a trustee of funds for others, is entitled to consider the welfare
of the community, and refrain from allowing the use of the funds in a manner
detrimental to society.
3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 227.17, at 499-500 (4th ed.
1988).
25. Id. at 500. At least one appellate court has recently cited Professor Scott as authority
for allowing a municipal pension fund to accept a small loss from the transaction and
diversification costs associated with divesting from corporations doing business in South
Africa. See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720, 736-37 (Md. 1989). In
Baltimore City, the Baltimore City Council voted to invest the assets of its defined benefit
pension plan using a negative screen excluding the securities of companies which invest in
South Africa. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision allowing
divestment. Id. at 757. The court cited Professor Scott's treatise and reasoned that a trustee
does not violate its duty of loyalty if the financial sacrifices are de minimis. Id. at 736-38. See
also Garret M. Smith, Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore: Public Pension Fund Divestment
of South African Securities Upheld, 49 Md. L Rev. 1030, 1032-40 (1990) (outlining the trial
court's approach to addressing the challenges to the city ordinance, which required city
employee pension plan funds to divest holdings of businesses and banks in South Africa, and
critiquing its findings); Recent Case, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1990)(discussing Board of
Trustees v. City of Baltimore).
26. Populism properly refers to the late-nineteenth century agrarian and labor political
movement as well as the People's Party of America. Gene Clanton, Populism: The Humane
Preference in America, 1890-1900, at xi (1991). The movement resulted from a perceived
conflict between eastern bankers and industrialists and western farmers regarding federal
currency policy. The movement dissolved when farm product prices rose. Se also Robert C.
McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898, at 25 (1993). This Article uses
the term in its modem sense, however, which generally refers to various popular political

CHARITABLE CORPORATE GIVING
This Artide asserts that the justifications employed by courts in the first
half of the twentieth century to expand the direct benefit doctrine in the
charitable corporate giving context provide a foundation for allowing
socially responsible investing in the pension fund context today. In
formulating this thesis, Part I of this Article surveys the present limitations
placed upon pension fund fiduciaries in the context of socially responsible
investing. Part II then describes the traditional legal model of the
corporation. Part III reviews the history of charitable corporate giving and
introduces the doctrine of direct corporate benefit. More specifically, Part
III argues that courts expanded the legally permissible scope of charitable
corporate giving as they sought to encourage charitable contributions in
response to the changing structure of the country's economy and the
corporate accumulation of surplus social wealth. Part III, then, exposes the
doctrine of direct corporate benefit as a fiction designed to allow greater
access to private capital for public use. Part IV examines the corresponding
changes in the tax code which resulted in the inversion of the traditional
direct corporate benefit doctrine under the guise of the direct benefit rule.
Finally, Part V demonstrates that the jurisprudential trends surrounding
the expansion of permissible charitable corporate giving are best
understood by reference to state-level populist influences demanding

increased public access to private wealth. Part V suggests that the
jurisprudence underlying modem corporate charitable giving presents a
persuasive justification for the socially responsible investment of pension
funds.
I. A TRADmoNAL ANALYsIs OF CHARITABLE CORPORATE GIrING
In 1980, Professors Langbein and Posner observed that "few
individuals have found the trade-off' of a lower return from socially
responsible investments attractive. 28 Socially responsible investing,

movements that have sought to empower their constituents.
27. Commentators continue to vigorously debate whether socially responsible investing
leads to a lower return. See eg., Leslie Eaton, Principled Investments: Doing Well By Doing
Good, Barron's, Jan. 18, 1993, at 37 (discussing success of socially responsible funds in
yielding above average returns); Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Many "Nice Guy" Funds Fail to Make
Nice Profits, Wall St. J., July 7, 1993, at Cl (discussing failure of socially responsible funds to
make better than average returns). Modem portfolio theory suggests that, although excluding
a substantial number of securities will inevitably invite portfolio fluctuation and may reduce
total return in the long run, excluding a small number of securities will have a minimal effect.
On the other hand, consumers have developed a great sensitivity to corporate social behavior.
See, eg., Rosalyn Will et al., Shopping for a Better World 1992 (1991). The emergence of such
a movement may present the market with variables it has no experience in analyzing.
28. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 75. Professors Langbein and Posner suggested
that there is a trade-off between profit maximization and socially responsible investing. Their
modem portfolio theory also suggests that excluding a very small number of securities will not
lead to any additional risk of loss. In fact, the modem portfolio theory which Professors
Langbein and Posner adopted suggests that small individual investors who do not diversify can
invest in a limited socially responsible manner without economic consequence. Thus, an
investor who chooses any single security for noneconomic reasons is no worse off in economic
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however, has grown dramatically in recent years. 9 In 1985, professional
investment managers controlled $100 billion in socially responsible
investments for socially concerned investors.5s By 1993, this figure had
grown to over $650 billion'
To some extent, the term "socially responsible investing" is misleading
because federal, state, and local law, which explicitly codify certain moral
principles and social considerations, regulate all marketable securities and
enforceable contracts. These statutes force investors, even modem portfolio
theory investors who do not explicitly employ ethical criteria, to invest in
some sort of socially responsible manner. To the extent that these laws
vindicate particular values,12 legislative and judicial negative screens affect
all marketable investments. One cannot, for example, knowingly invest in

terms. Professors Langbein and Posner's argument is simply that a socially responsible investor
would be subject to greater market fluctuation, not to general economic loss.
29. In addition to socially responsible investing, socially responsible marketing and
consumption also have risen dramatically in the United States. In addition, the advent of
"cause-related marketing" suggests that the market has internalized consumers' desires to
associate with and promote socially responsible products and cause. Thus, major manufacturera and marketers have concluded that consumers will often care more about the product's
socially responsible image than about the product itself. See Yvonne Daley, Social Goals Help
Vt. Firms Profit, Boston Globe, Dec. 15, 1991, at 77, 77; Mark Henricks, Doing Well By Doing
Good, Small Bus. Rep., Nov. 1991, at 28, 29-30; Joshua Levine, I Gave at the Supermarket,
Forbes, Dec. 25, 1989, at 138, 138.
30. Penelope Wang, You Can Be Clean and Green by Investing in Ecology, Peace and
Social Harmony and Still... Finish First, Money, June 1991, at 130, 130.
31. Dowie, supra note 13, at 551. If these figures are accurate, that amount may account
for approximately 10% of all invested capital. Id. Moreover, these figures certainly
underestimate the real magnitude of socially responsible investing because they do not
include the assets of individual investors who control their ovm portfolios in a socially
responsible manner-either by using negative screens or by investing in local municipal bonds
to fund schools and other civic projects. On the other hand, more than 95% of the quoted
$650 billion figure is subject only to a South African screen. Id. at 552.
Professors Langbein and Posner reported that at the time they wrote their article, only
three mutual funds adhered to social investing principles. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9,
at 74 n.10. Today, however, more than 30 socially responsible mutual and money market
funds are available. See Susan Feyder, For These Investors, Returns Aren't Bottom Line:
Variety of Funds Encourage Socially Responsible Choice, Minneapolis Star Trib., Apr. 4, 1993,
at 3D.
32. Postmodernity's major contribution, after all, has been to suggest that what exists is
not necessarily what always has been, or what ought to be. See, eg., Stanley E. Fish, Is There a
Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities 21-67 (1980) (arguing that
literary interpretation depends on the experience of the reader, rather than on the text
Itself). At base, different laws represent different values, and society has chosen to vindicate
different values during different periods of time. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law, 1780-1860, at 4.40 (1977) (arguing that, during late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, common law ceased to be perceived as having been derived from
natural law and instead was regarded as a means by which to govern society and promote
socially desirable conduct); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by
Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 Duke L.J. 625, 631-32 (1990)
(arguing that the law is not an absolute or universal force and that prevailing forms of
language limit social understanding of legal concepts).

CHARITABLE CORPORATE GIVING
an illicit drug smuggling venture without becoming part of a conspiracy.
Similarly, because corporations must abide by antitrust, civil rights,
packaging, and a multitude of other laws, individuals may not opt to invest
in securities of corporations that engage in activities violating these laws.
All investing, therefore, is unobtrusively and regularly restricted by laws
that reflect some sort of societal moral consensus.
The interesting investment issues appear, however, as investments
move from the illegal black of the judicial spectrum to the legal but
ethically suspect gray--from illegal narcotics to chewing tobacco or from
the unsanctioned export of nudear technology to the domestic
manufacture of handguns. The same dynamic, after all, is at work. When
something is illegal, it is because a group of people, at one time
resembling a majority, prohibited it for some reason.33 The socially
responsible investor, however, does not accept the majority's current
doctrine and decides independently whether the activity at issue is
objectionable in light of its social and economic consequences." The
modem portfolio theory investor, on the other hand, accepts the current
doctrine as an economic baseline and considers all legal securities as
prospective investments, regardless of potential noneconomic consequences s5
33. Obviously, simply making something illegal does not silence the debate over that
thing's desirability. Witness, for example, the recent debates over decriminalizing narcotics
and legalized gambling. SeeA Symposium on Drug Decriminalization, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 457
(1990) (dealing exclusively with the drug legalization debate); see also Richard L Miller, The
Case for Legalizing Drugs (1991) (discussing the various arguments for legalizing drugs);
Jeffrey C. Hallam, Rolling the Dice, 85 Nw. U. L Rev. 240, 262 (1990) (citing Judy Heffner,
Legalized Gambling in the States: Who Really Wins?, St. Legislatures, Sept. 1981, at 6, 16);
Gregory H. & Sara C. Williams, America's Drug Policy: Who Are the Addicts, 75 Iowa L. Rev.
1119 (1990) (reconsidering the classification of drug addicts); Lisa J. Keyes, Comment,
Rethinking the Aim of the "War on Drugs": States' Roles in Preventing Substance Abuse by
Pregnant Women, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 197 (considering various methods of preventing
substance abuse by pregnant women).
34. The screens an investor or consumer should choose to employ present a normative
question beyond the scope of this Article. It is important, however, to note that, empirically,
different individuals make different choices with regard to investment and consumer
products. It is dear that not every individual is a blind economic actor and that maximizing
return is as normative an investment strategy as any other. Of course, the infinite number of
possible investment strategies makes it difficult to design a practical solution to the political
issues involved in investing pension funds. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (stating
that preferences vary among investors). This Article's analysis of charitable corporate giving
suggests, however, that logical conceptual schemes do not always dictate the law's development, and that lack of a conceptually appealing analysis should not prevent inquiry into this
issue.
35. Some modern portfolio theory adherents have referred to this investment approach
as "neutral." See, e.g., James D. Hutchinson & Charles C. Cole, Legal Standards Governing
Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. Pa. L Rev. 1340, 1344
(1980) (defining "neutral" investment policies as focusing solely on the financial aspects of
investment alternatives); Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Social Investing, IOLTA and the Law of
Trusts: The Settlor's Case Against the Political Use of Charitable and Client Funds, 22 Loy. U.
Chi. LJ. 163, 167-68 (1990) (concluding that the common law of trusts allows a trust settior to
prevent a trustee from engaging in political activity with trust assets). The idea that ethical
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Historically, although individuals have retained the freedom to invest
in funds or entities of their choice, pension fund managers could not
consider noneconomic criteria in making investment decisions.
Commentators almost unanimously agree that the common-law concept of
fiduciary responsibility restricts pension fund trustees from employing any
noneconomic criteria in making investment decisions.36 Proponents of
this view dismiss any notion that pension fund trustees can accept
reasonable financial sacrifices based upon social or ethical considerations. s As the next two sections suggest, however, an analogy to the
history of corporate charitable giving may provide a justification for the
socially responsible investment of pension funds.

II. THE CORPORATE MODEL
Corporations are legal entities governed by state statutes.-" A
corporation is an artificial person, owned by individual shareholders, that
has its own distinct corporate name. In the general conceptual scheme, the
corporation substitutes itself for its shareholders in conducting corporate
business and incurring liability.
A board of directors runs the corporation. The shareholders elect

Issues are not properly considered in the business context is not new. See State ex reA Pillsbury
v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406, 411 (Minn. 1971) (noting that seeking names of corporate
shareholders to influence corporation political behavior is not a proper purpose).
It is true that a portfolio which limits fluctuation has advantages, particularly for the
risk-averse. On the other hand, the neutral approach values risk-aversion and makes other
sacrifices to vindicate that goal. In short, investing is thoroughly and unavoidably political.
The question is not whether to invest based upon political values, but what values to vindicate.
The Issues socially responsible investors recognize are the same issues that stir political debates
at all levels of government. It is also unlikely that any theorist would charge a lack of
diversification for failing to invest in a socially stigmatized industry or product. See Dobris,
supra note 17, at 232 (observing that the legalization of prostitution in Nevada does not
require a fiduciary to invest in brothels, even if they are likely to be profitable).
36. See, ag., Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959) (stating that the "trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiary"); Troyer et al., supra note 17, at 156-58 (stating that the trustee's purpose is to
provide benefits to the beneficiary and that social considerations are permissible only if
incidental).
37. See, eg., Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 96-104 (suggesting that investments
made for purposes other than those solely in the interests of the beneficiary would violate
ERISA); Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done
Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 Lab. L.J. 387, 391-92 (1980)(indicating that a plan which
incorporates investments made with social criteria and without consideration of traditional
factors would violate ERISA).
38. For a more in-depth analysis of the laws and principles governing corporations see
Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., West's Business Law:. Texts, Cases, Legal Environment (3d ed.
1986); Robert W. Hamilton, Cases and Materials on Corporations (?d ed. 1986); Richard W.
Jennings &Richard M. Buxbaum, Corporations: Cases and Materials (5th ed. 1979); LC.B.
Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1369 (1956); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 72 Yale LJ. 223, 245
(1962).
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these individuals and entrust them with the overall management of the
corporation. The corporate charter or articles of incorporation must
specify the intended business of the corporation, and statutory law defines
the corporation's rights and duties. In their simplest conception,
corporations allow several shareholders to pool their resources into a single
venture. One of the main advantages of the corporate form, of course, is
that it combines this pooling of tremendous resources and profit potential
with limited liability to the shareholders. The principle of limited liability
arises from a legal fiction that regards the corporate body as separate and
distinct from the owners of the corporation.
As creatures of statute, the law traditionally did not allow corporations
to contract or operate outside the four comers of their corporate
charters. 9 The fundamental notion that corporations are established
strictly for the benefit of the shareholders provides the primary foundation
for this traditional limitation. As such, in addition to managing the
corporation, the directors have a strict duty to maximize shareholder
profits within the specified parameters of the corporate articles.
Over fifty years ago, in a preeminent work, Professors Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means questioned this traditional notion of "shareholder
primacy" as inconsistent with their view of the corporate form's separation
of ownership and control.4 They asserted that shareholders were
generally passive owners-widely diversified risk bearers with little incentive
or ability to monitor management's activities in the myriad of corporations
in which they invested. 4' Corporate managers, in contrast, typically owned
little of the corporation's stock, yet controlled the entity's operations.
Because managers had little capital invested in the firm, their primary goal
often was to maximize their own utility, rather than maximize shareholder
wealth.4 2 Professors Berle and Means further suggested that the ability of
shareholders to elect directors, and therefore control management, was
relatively meaningless in the context of large corporations. Increasingly,
they asserted, management controlled the proxy machinery and hence the
election's outcome. 3 Management, in short, became a self-perpetuating
oligarchy," which in turn left shareholders without any real power.4
Modem economic theorists view the problems created by the
separation of ownership and control in a different light. These theorists
describe the corporation as the central party to a contractual arrangement
This interrelationship necessarily
between managers and owners.

39. 18Am.Jur. 2d Corporations §§ 73-75 (1985).
40. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 244-45 (1932); see also Matheson & Olson, supra note 4, 130-33 (discussing history
of corporate-governance principles and solutions to separation of ownership and control).
41. Berle & Means, supra note 40, at 66-68.
42. Id. at 121-24.
43. Id. at 84-118.
44. Id. at 124-25.

45. Id.
46. Michael C.Jensen &William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
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involves an agency relationship in which the owners (shareholders) act as
principals receiving the benefits of the firm's profitability and growth, with

management acting as their agent4 7 In essence, the owners bear the risks
associated with the enterprise, and as specialized decision makers, the
managers run the corporation for the benefit of the owners.
The primary benefit of the corporate form is readily apparent. Skilled

managers, although lacking capital to finance the firm's investments, can
run the corporation, and shareholders, despite their lack of managerial
skills, can invest in the firm and realize a return on their investment.4
This specialization of functions also allows investors to diversify their4
portfolios, thereby reducing risk and making investment more attractive. 1

The agency relationship, however, does not come without cost. Foremost,
the agency relationship exposes owners to the risk that the managers will
use the owners' funds for management's benefit. This risk creates agency
costs-the costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effective

performance from its agent.0 From this perspective, the dilemma posed
by the separation of ownership and control is not an issue of "shareholder

primacy." Rather, it raises the question of how to reduce the agency costs
owners incur in monitoring their agents when attempting to prevent

fiduciary abuse and indolent "shirking."
Traditionally, corporate law has addressed the agency cost problem by

imposing a number of legal obligations on corporate directors. The law
imposes liability on managers for any breach of the fiduciary duties of care

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 306 (1976) (espousing a unified
theory of the firm and its relation to agency costs).
47. See, e.g., id. (illustrating this agency relationship); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L & Econ. 301, 302 (1983) (describing
problems associated with this agency relationship).
48. Fama &Jensen, supra note 47, at 302; Eugene F. Famna & Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L & Econ. 327, 329-30 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. Pol. Econ. 288, 290-92 (1980).
49. Modern portfolio theory maintains that investors may reduce their risk by investing in
many different companies. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain
in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L Rev. 1, 19 (1986) (explaining that "[plortfolio theory
divides the risk associated with any security into two components: a firm-specific component
and a systematic or non-diversifiable component associated with general market conditions");
Fama &Jensen, supra note 48, at 329 ("Common stock allows residual risk to be spread across
many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to which they bear risk and who
can diversify across organizations offering such claims."); Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at
83-96 (discussing portfolio adjustments made by the social investor).
The value of modem portfolio theory as more than a theoretical model, however, is still
widely debated and subject to qualifications from unorthodox theories. Se4 e.g., Steve Secklo,
For Stock Market Advice, Just Call the Meteorologist for Manhattan, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1993,
at BI (reporting that University of Massachusetts Finance Professor Edward M. Saunders, Jr.
finds that weather is an important factor in dayto-day market performance).
50. See Farma & Jensen, supra note 47, at 304 (defining agency costs as the costs of
structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among parties with conflicting
Interests); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 46, at 308-10 (explaining the agency costs between
ownership and management).
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and loyalty owed to shareholders. 51 Under the duty of care, a manager has
a fiduciary duty to act in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and
in a manner the manager reasonably believes to be in the corporation's
best interests.52 The business judgment rule requires courts to presume
that managers have fulfilled their requisite duty of care unless they have
acted with gross negligence. 5 The duty of loyalty requires managers to
make decisions in the best interests of the corporation and without regard
to their own individual interests.m In essence, this duty prohibits
management from faithlessness and self-dealing.! To insure compliance,
courts employ a strict standard of review when they consider management
decisions involving direct conflicts of interest.
Beyond these duties, other forces constrain managerial indiscretion.
Contractual relationships reduce agency costs by providing shareholders
with both the ability to displace management, through the periodic
election of directors, 7 and a means of aligning management's interests
with the firm's through the use of incentives such as performance based
compensation or stock options.68 Market forces, such as the labor
market,5 9 as well as production markets ° and the market for corporate

51.

See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 93-140 (1986) (analyzing allocation of corporate

powers and duties).
52. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 945, 948 (1990) (proposing that a corporate director's duty of care consists of
three distinct duties: (1) the duty to monitor the corporation's business, (2) the duty to
inquire about information which raises cause for concern, and (8) the duty to exercise care in
making decisions both procedurally, by insuring that directors are properly informed of all
relevant information, and substantively, by requiring a rational belief that the decision was in
best interests of the company). See generaly Dennis j. Block et al., The Business Judgement
Rule-Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers and Directors 28 (1989); William E. Knepper &
Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors § 2.01 (4th ed. 1988).
53. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984); see also Alan R. Palmiter,
Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 Tex. L.
Rev. 1351, 1358 (1989). Invoking the business judgment rule permits courts to avoid secondguessing the merits of a business decision, provided that no evidence of bad faith or selfdealing on the part of management exists.
54. See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 937-40 (1983).
55. Block et al., supra note 52, at 73.
56. Palmiter, supra note 53, at 1364-65.
57. See g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 221 (1991) (providing that the certificate of
incorporation may provide shareholders and creditors with the power to vote on such
matters).
58. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 46, at 32338; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum,
A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi.
L Rev. 187, 196-97 (1991). Professor Fama has disputed the notion that fractional ownership
by managers will itself solve the dilemma of agency costs. Fama, supra note 48, at 291-92.
59. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale
UJ. 698, 701 (1982)(discussing constraints on management through salary, bonuses, and
reputation); Fama, supra note 48, at 292-95 (suggesting that the desire for positive evaluation
of ability and such evaluation's effect on current employment and the marketability for
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control6' may also constrain managerial abuses. Proponents of the marketmonitoring theory posit that corporations offering shareholders the highest
returns will garner the largest investments and prosper more than other
62
entities, thereby advancing management's interest in job security.
Importantly, the separation of ownership and control inherent in the
corporate form also makes it more likely that corporate management will
subvert the individual shareholder's ownership interest in the corporation
and displace the shareholder's judgment by making corporate charitable
gifts. 65 Not only does this usurpation of control obscure the shareholders'
rights to control their assets, choose their own charitable causes, or not
make any donations at all, it also centralizes control in the managers and
away from the individual holders of wealth.64 Such control, argued
theorists Milton Friedman65 and Friedrich Hayekr subverts the capitalist
alternate and future employment will restrain managers from acting inconsistently with the
interests of corporate owners).
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 59, at 701 (asserting that fierce product
competition demands a diligently and efficiently managed firm).
61. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1169-73 (1981);
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5,
6 (1983); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (recognizing validity of
market for corporate control). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate
Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1153-54 (1984) (rejecting notion of market for
corporate control).
62. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L
Rev. 1416, 1419-21 (1989).
63. At the current time, the tax code obscures such decisions because the double
taxation of corporate income gives corporations and shareholders strong incentives to make
such gifts. Conceptually, however, the analysis remains the same.
64. Some commentators have suggested that government, not individuals or corporations,
should choose where to spend surplus wealth. Such a scheme would likely involve a
progressive income tax system. On the other hand, government is an even more majoritarian
system than corporate governance. Allowing it to distribute surplus social wealth would also
stifle minority interests.
65.
In... [a free enterprise economy] there is one and only one social
responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits ....
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundation our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to
make as much money for their stockholders as possible.
.[T]he claim that business should contribute to the support of charitable
activities ... is an inappropriate use of corporate funds in a free enterprise society.
The corporation is an instrument of the stockholders who own it If the
corporation makes a contribution, it prevents the individual stockholder from
himself deciding how he should dispose of his funds.
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133, 135 (1962).
66. Hayek argued that governments should plan economies which decentralize decision
making and allow more economic actors to make decisions in order to create greater
freedom: "[P]arties in the market should be free to sell and buy at any price at which they
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system by centralizing decision making in irresponsible bodies having no
right to make such decisions and, more importantly, no incentive to
carefully consider the propriety and potential impact of these decisions.
Friedman's argument is logical and theoretically seductive. First, he
correctly observed that allowing corporations to make charitable
contributions deprives shareholders of the ability to exercise their own
ownership interests in that entity. Second, it is inefficient for centralized
bodies to make decisions about charity. Each individual's interest in
promoting a particular political agenda, an alma mater, or a pet charity
sways the decision-making calculus. Third, as Friedman implied in his
discussion of discrimination, centralizing control in a majoritarian manner
will hurt charitable organizations with politically unpopular ideas.67 After
all, even a celebrated corporate giver like the Dayton-Hudson Corporation
will not likely contribute to politically unpopular groups.'
Friedman's approach is theoretically sympathetic and logically
consistent with the common-law restraints on charitable corporate giving
that preceded recent statutory authorization of that practice. 9 However,
his analysis ignores the limitations American democratic society has
imposed upon corporations over time. Historically, United States citizens
have not hesitated to appropriate corporate private property for public
use.70 Moreover, citizens can easily affect corporate profit maximization,

can find a partner to the transaction and... anybody should be free to produce, sell, and
buy anything that may be produced or sold at all." Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom
37 (1944). "The dash between planning and democracy arises simply from the fact that the
latter is an obstacle to the suppression of freedom which the direction of economic activity
requires." Id. at 70. See generaly Capitalism and the Historians (FA. Hayek ed., 1954); 2 F.A.
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1976).
67. Friedman, supra note 65, at 108-18. Friedman argued enthusiastically that because
discrimination is economically inefficient, the market will drive out competitors who
discriminate. Similarly, when more actors make economic decisions, those decisions will be
more efficient in economic terms.
68. Dayton-Hudson Corporation recently tried to terminate its contributions to Planned
Parenthood because of the political controversy surrounding that group. In the end, it did not
terminate funding because of political pressure opposed to the measure. A group with a
narrower base than Planned Parenthood in a less politically hospitable environment than
Minnesota would probably not receive funding from corporations. See Kevin Kelly, Dayton
Hudson Finds There's No Graceful Way to Flip-Flop, Bus. Wk., Sept. 24, 1990, at 50; DaytonHudson Rethinks Aid to Group for Pro-Choice, Women's Wear Daily, Sept. 14, 1990, at 10;
Dayton-Hudson Reinstates Its Grant for Pro-Choicers, Women's Wear Daily, Sept. 21, 1990, at
15.
69. See supra notes 36-37.
70. See, ag., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution and Justice, 88 Colum. L
Rev. 1714, 1720-21 (1988) (arguing that the law refuses to recognize private property rights
when such rights become socially undesirable). Land-use and environmental laws are also
good examples. Land-use laws deprive people of what some consider property rights. See
generaly Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law, 73 B.U. L Rev. 389 (1993); David P. Hutchinson, A Setback for the Rivers of
Massachusetts? An Application of Regulatory Takings Doctrine to the Watershed Protection
Act and the Massachusetts River Protection Act, 73 B.U. L Rev. 237 (1993); Norman Marcus,
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like other matters, through both the state and federal political systems. 71
In fact, several commentators have even suggested that popular support for
the existence of corporations arises largely from the practice of corporate
charitable giving.72 Friedman, however, left an important question
unanswered: Would individuals, via their pension funds, ultimately make
the same sort of charitable contributions that corporations presently make
if they also were to receive additional, nonmonetary dividends? This Article
addresses that question.

III. A TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF CHARITABLE CotPoPAu,. GIVING
Prior to the recent trend of statutory codification, s the common law
employed the direct corporate benefit doctrine to determine when a
corporation's directors could make charitable contributions out of

Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the Well-Considered Plan, 50
Brook. L Rev. 867 (1984); Michelle A. WVenzel, The Model Surface Use and Mineral
Development Accommodation Act- Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 Am. U. L Rev.
607 (1993). Environmental laws also restrict people's liberties and, to some extent, property
rights. See generally Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through
Preemptive Federal Easement Programs, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 401 (1993).
71. Small changes in the tax code and jury perceptions of corporations in products
liability and employment law cases could have a dramatic effect on corporate profits as well as
the long-term benefits of the corporate entity. See generally Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal
Income Taxation (5th ed. 1988); John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal
Income Tax (1985).
72. Dayton-Hudson Corporation's former chief executive officer, Kenneth Dayton, has
argued that business corporations exist to serve society and that, if they do not undertake
such service, the public may take their corporate advantages away from them:
I maintain that business must change its priorities. We are not in business to make
maximum profit for our shareholders. We are in business for only one reason-to
serve society. Profit is our reward for doing it welL If btuiness does not serve society,
sociely will not tolerateourprofits or even our existence.
Lee Smith, The Unsentimental Corporate Giver, Fortune, Sept. 21, 1981, at 120, 121
(emphasis added). Courts have echoed this concern:
[C]ontemporary courts recognize that unless corporations carry an increasing share
of the burden of supporting charitable and educational causes that the business
advantages now reposed in corporations by law may well prove to be unacceptable to
the representatives of an aroused public.
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (DeL 1969). Like Kenneth Dayton,
the Thcodora court saw corporate charitable side payments as the price the public extracted
from corporations in exchange for limited liability, free transferability, unlimited life, and
other traditional corporate advantages. In this regard, corporate charitable giving constitutes a
direct benefit to the corporation. The free-rider problem, however, would likely make any
particular corporation's gifts insignificant to the corporation's maintenance of corporate
advantages.
The idea of a social quid pro quo extends beyond corporations. For a discussion of the
populist use of transfer taxes, see Regis W. Campfield et al., Cases and Materials, Taxation of
Estates, Gifts and Trusts, 1991-1993, at 882 (1991) ("Napoleon is reported to have said that
'religion is what keeps the poor from murdering the rich.' In modem times the transfer tax
should be reckoned as a real force for stability in society.").
73. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
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corporate assets or profits without violating their duty to maximize
shareholder profits. This section suggests that, as accumulated wealth
gradually transferred from individual industrialists 74 to corporations,
courts stretched the concept of direct corporate benefit to vindicate
society's desire to use private resources for public purposes. Because the
recent concentration of social wealth in pension funds presents a
contemporary analogue to this earlier economic shift, this section
establishes a framework on which to base an extension of the doctrine to
the context of socially responsible investment of pension funds.
A. HistoricalLimitations on Corporate Charitable Giving
Charitable giving-' is an important concept in Judeo-Christian history
and culture.76 Indeed, at times, charitable giving has been perceived as a
condition precedent to social acceptance within particular communities.
Religious communities, for example, cite the tradition of giving to the
downtrodden as a directive to share with the community."7 Interestingly,
these communities traditionally have valued giving for noneconomic
reasons.78 In other words, giving demonstrates belief in and commitment

74. This Article does not examine the law prior to the industrial revolution. During that
time, landowners largely controlled wealth. It seems anecdotally attractive, however, to suggest
that royal landowners served much the same charitable giving purpose prior to the eighteenth
century. In England, for example, the landed aristocracy endowed Oxford and Cambridge
Universities. These universities retain much of those real estate holdings today. See; ag., 2 T.H.
Ashton & J.I. Catto, The History of the University of Oxford 635-57 (1984). Tocqueville,
however, reported in 1848 that control of charitable institutions in Europe had moved from
corporations and individuals to governments. Tocqueville, supra note 1, at 680. The United
States has avoided centralizing control of charitable institutions in the government.
75. Charity is "a gift for.., public benevolent purposes." Black's Law Dictionary 235 (6th
ed. 1990). For a historical discussion of charity, see Howard S. Miller, The Legal Foundations
of American Philanthropy, 1776-1884 (1961).
76. The United States is not the only country which has faced the issue of socially
responsible investing. The English judicial system recently considered whether the Bishop of
Oxford could sell land at below market value to a developer building low-cost housing. The
English court did not allow the sale, holding that although a charity may make gifts, it may
not sell land at below market rates. See Richard Nobles, Charities and Ethical Investment,
Conveyancer & Property Lawyer, Mar-Apr. 1992, at 115-18 (discussing what Nobles calls a
peculiar decision in the unreported case of Bishop of Oxford v. The Church Commissioners).
77. The Bible directs the faithful to give 10% of their income to those in needWhen you have finished paying all the tithe of your produce... giving it to the
Levites, the aliens, the orphans, and the widows, so that they may eat their fill within
your towns, then you shall say before the Lord your God. ... "I have obeyed the
Lord my God, doing just as you commanded me...."
Deuteronomy 26:12-15 (New Revised Standard).
78. Instead of emphasizing the value of the contribution to those who can use the
money, the story of the poor widow shows the noneconomic and nonutilitarlan importance of
giving.
(Jesus] sat down opposite the treasury, and watched the crowd putting money into
the treasury. Many rich people put in large sums. A poor widow came and put in two
small copper coins, which are worth a penny. Then he called his disciples and said to
them, 'Truly I tell you, this poor widow has put in more than all those who are
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to the community.
Nineteenth-century, industrialist, philanthropist, and robber-baron
Andrew Carnegie similarly believed that wealthy individuals should share
their wealth with their respective communities. 79 Carnegie asserted that
people who own "enormous fortunes" should manage those resources "to
promote the permanent good of the communities from which they have
been gathered." 80 Carnegie also predicted "that public sentiment would
soon say of one who dies possessed of millions of available wealth with
which he might have administered: 'The man who dies rich thus dies
disgraced."'' In Carnegie's eyes, a wealthy person who died without
2
having distributed his or her wealth to the community was a bad citizen.
Historically, then, society has consistently valued and sought to
encourage charitable giving. As late as the 1950s, however, the legitimacy
and legality of charitable giving by corporations remained an uncertain
proposition." The common law generally precluded corporations from
making charitable gifts because it considered gifts to even the most
respected charitable organizations as ultra vires violations of shareholder

contributing to the treasury. For all of them have contributed out of their
abundance; but she out of her poverty has put in everything she had, all she had to
live on."
Mark 12:41-44 (New Revised Standard). The point of the story, after all, is that the widow
needs the money as much as, or more than, the people who the gift will ultimately benefit. See
also Luke 21:1-4 (New Revised Standard) (same story).
79. Andrew Carnegie, The Best Fields For Philanthropy, 149 N. Am. Rev. 683, 684-85

(1889).
80. Id. at 685.
81. Id.
82. Interestingly, contemporary society uses this same language of citizenship to describe
socially responsible corporate behavior. Society celebrates corporations which make charitable
contributions to the community by deeming them "good corporate citizens." Harvard and
Columbia Universities, The Council on Economic Priorities, The Business Enterprise Trust,
and The Center for Economic and Social justice all make awards to recognize good corporate
behavior. Blaine Townsend, The Corporate Responsibility Hall of Fame, Bus. & Soc'y Rev.,
Spring 1992, at 47, 48. These organizations recognize corporations which protect the
environment, contribute to their respective communities, make significant charitable
contributions, and are equal opportunity employers. Id. at 48-49. Some of these organizations
also single out for dishonorable mention corporations that engage in practices such as
clearcutting redwood forests, compiling poor environmental or safety records, marketing
cigarettes to children, failing to disclose information, and failing to make charitable
contributions. Id. at 50. For a list of corporations deemed to be good corporate citizens, see
Jerry W. Anderson Jr., Corporate Social Responsibility 179-84 (1989); Patrick McVeigh, Ten
Top Companies for the 1990s: Dispatches from the Front Lines of Corporate Social
Responsibility, Bus. & Soc'y Rev., Spring 1992, at 33, 33-34.
83. 6A William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations,
§ 2938, at 746 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1989) [hereinafter Fletcher]. See also J.J. Marticelli,
Annotation, Power of a Business Corporation to Donate to a Charitable or Similar Institution,
39 A.L.R. 2d 1192, 1194 (1955) (noting that the authority to make charitable contributions, if
not in an enabling statute, is implied from the corporation's purpose). See geieray McCrory v.
Chambers, 48 Il1.App. 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1892); Polar Star Lodge No. 1 v. Polar Star Lodge
No. 1, 16 La. Ann. 53 (La. 1861).
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rights.O Courts uniformly held that corporate directors, in executing their

fiduciary duties to the corporation's shareholders, could not deviate from
the black letter of the corporate charter."
Harriman v. The First Bryan Baptist Church85 illustrates this strict
approach in construing corporate charters. In Harriman, the First Bryan
Baptist Church sought to raise funds to retire debts it had incurred in the
construction of a new church.87 To raise funds, the church contracted to
charter a cruise vessel and sold tickets for passage on the ship.88 The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the contract violated the church's
corporate charter and consequently was void.89 Citing language in the
charter, 0 the court stated:
The erection of a church-edifice [is within the church's purpose
as a corporation, as is raising money to pay for the erection]....
The purpose was a worthy and laudable one.., but the power to
raise money for a proper object does not carry with it unlimited

discretion as to the means of raising it. Every corporation must
act according to its nature; a trading corporation must trade, a

manufacturing corporation must manufacture, a banking
corporation must bank, a transportation corporation must carry,
and a religious corporation must preach, teach, minister to
spiritual edification, and promote works of mercy and
benevolence. A church incorporated as such, cannot engage, even
for a day, in merchandizing... or in transporting freight or
passengers. It must derive its income, not from the conduct of any
worldly business, but from such property as it may happen to
own, and from voluntary contributions.9'
Thus, the court's rigid construction of the church's charter narrowly
circumscribed the sphere of activities in which the church legally could
engage.
Courts did not hesitate to utilize a similarly restrictive methodology
when determining whether a corporation's charitable donations
constituted ultra vires transgressions of the corporation's charter. In
Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exchange Bank of Springfield,9' a railway company sought

84. 6A Fletcher, supra note 83, § 2938, at 743; see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
85. 6A Fletcher, supra note 83, § 2938, at 743.
86. 63 Ga. 186 (1879).

87. Id. at 187.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 197.
90. The church's corporate charter permitted the church to engage in activities which
would directly foster "the more efficient worship of God, the preservation and perpetuation of
said church, and the better control and regulation of the affairs and property thereof." Id. at

189.
91. Hanima, 63 Ga. at 195-96. Thus, the church could raise money via this route only if
the church members would charter the vessel themselves, sell the tickets, and then donate the
proceeds to the church. Id. at 196.
92. 85 S.E. 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1915).
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to donate funds for the construction of a public school. 3 The company
hoped the school would increase the size of the surrounding community
situated on the company's railway line.9 Although the court acknowledged that the donation "might incidentally increase the transportation
business of the railway," it nevertheless held that the donation exceeded
the railway president's power and was, therefore, ultra vires and void. 5
Similarly, in Northwaese Universit v. Wesley Menwrial Hospita 9 the
Illinois Supreme Court stated that one charity could not make a gift to
another charity when such donations were not a chartered corporate
activity."7 Northwestern University gave Wesley Memorial Hospital $30,000
to provide instructional facilities for Northwestern University medical
students."3 The Illinois Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive
discussion of corporate purposes and ultimately allowed the conveyance.9
The court was very dear, however, in holding that Northwestern University
held these funds in trust for the specific charitable purposes enumerated
in its charter and that it could not legitimately characterize the conveyance
as a charitable gift.'00 Rather, the conveyance was legitimate only because
it furthered Northwestern University's chartered purpose of educating
medical doctors.' O'
This stringent adherence to corporate charters continued into the
middle part of the twentieth century. Courts continued to follow the blackletter approach and struck down corporate conveyances even when
corporate directors could show some direct benefit to the corporation in
furtherance of a chartered purpose. 0 2 In Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Company v. Tropic & East Fork Irrigation Co., Tropic & East Fork Irrigation
contracted with W.F. Holt to purchase water rights on the Sevier River.'

93. Id. at 635.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court stated:
It was beyond the powers of the president of a railway company incorporated under
the general laws of Georgia as a common carrier, either with or without the consent
of its board of directors, to donate funds belonging to the corporation, or to execute
in the corporate name a note to be discounted in behalf of or to raise funds as a
recognized donation for the erection of a public school, or for the purpose of
building up or promoting the town in which the school is situated, even though the
school or town be located on the line of the company's railway and its transportation
business might thereby be increased.

Id.
96. 125 N.E. 13 (I1. 1919).
97. Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 15.
99. Id. at 17-18.
100. In other words, Northwestern University's charter did not authorize the university to
make gifts to hospitals with which it was not connected. Id.
101. Northwestern Univ., 125 N.E. at 17.
102. Zion's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Tropic & E. Fork Irrigation Co., 126 P.2d 1053, 1056

(Utah 1942).
103.

Id. at 1054.
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In exchange for the water rights, Tropic gave Holt's wife a note for $5000.
Mrs. Holt assigned the note to the plaintiff bank, which held it as trustee
for her and her two children.' M After making payments for six years,
°
The
Tropic stopped paying on the note and the trustee filed suit.'O
had
the
plaintiff
suit,
holding
that
dismissed
the
Court
of
Utah
Supreme
06
water
purchasing
the
that,
in
no cause of action. The court concluded
rights, Tropic was "acting beyond the privileges conferred... by its
corporate charter and the laws of the state of Utah. " The court cited
Article XII, section 10 of the Utah Constitution, which states: "No
corporation shall engage in any business other than that expressly
authorized in its charter, or articles of incorporation."0 8 The court
concluded that Tropic's charter expressly authorized the company only to
build and repair canals'O As such, the contract was ultra vires and
void.1
The common law's conceptual scheme of corporate organization
suggested that corporations had no business making charitable
contributions. Rather, their sole appropriate task was to maximize profits
by executing the activities authorized in their corporate charters. Like
Adam Smith's butcher, baker, and brewer, courts held that corporations
owed their dinner to self-interest, not to social benevolence."'
Notwithstanding these common-law principles, changes in the control
of economic wealth, whereby corporations gradually displaced individual
entrepreneurs as the principal holders of economic wealth in the United
States, "resulted in calls upon corporations for reasonable philanthropic
donations."'1 2 Society, therefore, had to legitimize corporate charitable

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1056.
107. Zion's Saw. Bank, 126 P.2d at 1054. The Articles of Incorporation stated in relevant
part:
The object of this corporation is to construct a canal from the East Fork of the
Sevier River to Tropic and to keep the same in repair for the conducting of the
water of said stream to the town of Tropic also to control the waters of Bryce Canyon
for culinary and irrigation purposes for said Town.
Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Utah Const. art. XII, § 10).
109. Id. at 1055. See also supra note 107 (quoting the corporation's charter).
110. Zion's Sa. Banlk 126 P.2d at 1055.
111. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 113 (Andrew Skinner ed., 1986) (1776) ("It is
not to the benevolence of the butcher, baker or brewer that we owe our dinner, but from
their regard for their own self-interest").
112. 6A Fletcher, supra note 85, § 2938, at 743-44. See generally Myra Alperson, The Better
World Investment Guide 2 (1991) (tracing the history of socially responsible investing to its
genesis in religious investment movement); Anne Simpson, The Greening of Global
Investment: How the Environment, Ethics and Politics are Reshaping Strategies 27-39 (1991)
(summarizing the history of ethical investment in the United States).
At least one prominent commentator has argued that these structural changes in the
economy were felt at a multitude of levels. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century
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giving in order to maintain the level of charitable giving promoted by its
prevailing ideology and expected by its citizens.1n The economic
reorganization created a kind of populism which encouraged state
legislatures to amend their statutes to allow charitable corporate giving.
Beginning in 1920, and continuing through the 1950s, states passed
legislation superseding the common-law prohibition against corporate
charitable contributions.' 14 Today, "every state... has a statute giving
specific authority to corporations to make gifts for charitable...
purposes." "6

Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 Mich. L Rev. 722 (1988). As Professor
Langbein notes, these changes made estate planning much less important Because the nature
of wealth changed, traditional estate planning could no longer control its distribution. Id. at
737. As Professor Langbein argues, the important transfers of family wealth in late twentiethcentury American society occur as parents provide for their children's education, not through
the historically more important testamentary transfer of land. Because the modem economy
has rendered land relatively less important and land was usually transferred through
testamentary vehicles, testamentary gifts have become less important to modem society than
they were through the beginning of this century. Id. at 724-28.
113. One could argue, however, that the corporation's status as an artificial person
obscures the ownership rights of minority shareholders and therefore the corporation should
transfer all profits to shareholders who, in turn, may individually contribute to charitable
causes of their choice.
114. 6A Fletcher, supra note 83, § 2938, at 744; F. Emerson Andrews, Corporation Giving
23335 (1952).
115. 6AFletcher, supra note 83, § 2939; see ag., Ala. Code § 10-2B-3.02(13) (1994); Alaska
Stat. § 10.06.010(13) (1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-004(A)(13) (1990); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 4-26-204(a)(6) (Michie 1991); Cal. Corp. Code § 207(e) (Deering Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 7-103-102(1) (m) (Supp. 1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33291(d) (2) (1993); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1991); D.C. Code Ann. § 29-304(13) (1991); Fla. Stat. § 607.0302(12)
(1993); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-302(13) (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 415-4(13) (1985); Idaho Code
§ 30-1-4(m) (1980); Ill. Comp. Stat ch. 805, § 5/3.10(m) (Supp. 1993); Ind. Code § 23-1-222(13) (1993); Iowa Code § 490.302(13) (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-6102(9) (1988); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 271B.3-020(m) (Michie 1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:41(b) (12) (West 1994);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 13-A, § 202(1) (G) (West 1981); Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass'ns § 2103(13)(ii) (1993); Mass. Gen. L ch. 156B, § 9(k) (1992); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 450.1261(k) (West Supp. 1994); Minn. Stat § 302A.161(11) (1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-43.02(13) (Supp. 1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.385(15) (1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-115(13)
(1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2004(13) (Supp. 1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.070(6) (1993); N.HL
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A.3.02(13) (Supp. 1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A-3-4 (West Supp. 1994);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-4(M) (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a) (12) (McKinney
1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-17(a) (6); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-26(11) (Supp. 1993); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.13(D) (Baldwin (1994); Okla. Stat tit. 18, § 1016(9) (1991); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 60.077(n) (1993); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1502(a)(9) (Supp. 1994); R.L Gen. Laws
§ 7-1.1-4(13) (1992); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-3-102(13) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 47-2-58(13) (1991); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-13102(13) (1988); Tea. Bus. Corp. Act
Ann. art 2.02(A)(14) (West Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-4(1)(m) (1991); Vt. Stat
Ann. tit. I1A, § 3.02(13) (1993); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-627(A)(12) (Michie Supp. 1994);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23B.03.020(2) (o) (West 1994); W. Va. Code § 31-1-8(m) (1988 &
Supp. 1994); Wis. Stat. § 180.0302(13) (1991-92); Wyo. Stat. § 16-302(a)(xiii) (1989).
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B. The HistoricalDevelopment of the Doctrine ofDirect CorporateBenefit
Prior to this statutory transformation, courts were forced to reconcile
populist demands for access to corporate wealth with the common law's
traditional concern for shareholder rights and a general reluctance to
sanction charitable corporate giving. This prompted courts to craft an
exception to the common-law rules against corporate charitable giving.
Under the direct corporate benefit doctrine, courts would validate
corporate giving if the donation directly benefited the corporation and
generated greater profits for shareholders.'1 8 Over time, courts have
exhibited a willingness to manipulate this malleable doctrine to
accommodate ever-increasing societal demands for access to corporate
wealth.
One of the earliest cases applying the direct corporate benefit
doctrine arose before the institution of the federal income tax. Wealth
remained largely in the hands of individuals when the New York Supreme
Court decided Steinway v. Steinway & Sons in 1896.117 The Steinway &
Sons Corporation donated "property and money" toward the establishment
of a church, a school, a free library, and a free bath in Astoria, New York,
the site of the Steinway piano factory.18 Steinway also maintained a
program through which it donated pianos to musicians and county
fairs119 A minority shareholder brought suit against the corporation
alleging that by making these contributions the directors breached their
116. See, eg., Knoxv. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 196 F.2d 112, 117 (10th Cir. 1952):
[I]t is elementary that unless authorized by statute or effective charter provision
expressly creating the power, a corporation organized solely for conventional
business or commercial purposes may not alien its property by gift or indirect
channels of diversion without consideration and not in furtherance of its pecuniary
interests... The alienation or disposition of property of a corporation in that
manner constitutes a violation of the rights of the stockholders and is ultra vires.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Forbes Lithograph Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 F.2d 287, 289 (D.Mass.
1930) (holding that payments by manufacturing corporation to foundation established to
assist employees and their dependents were within the "ordinary and necessary expense of
carrying on trade"); American Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314, 314 (6th Cir.
1930) (holding that contributions to civic improvement fund by corporation employing half
the city's wage-earners was deductible as "ordinary and necessary expense incurred in carrying
on trade"); American Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Ricketts, 19 S.W.2d 1071, 1072 (Ky. 1929)
(holding that the "voluntary payments made by a corporation cannot be recovered) 6A
Fletcher, supra note 83, § 2938, at 746. For a history of cases leading up to these decisions,
see Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U.S. 294 (1894); McGeorge v. Big Stone Gap
Improvement Co., 57 F. 262 (Cir. Ct.W.D.Va. 1893); Vandall v. South San Francisco Dock
Co., 40 Cal. 83 (1870); B.S. Green Co. v. Blodgett, 159 Ill. 169 (1895).
117. 40 N.YS. 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896). The Steinway & Sons Corporation made its
contributions at approximately the same time that Carnegie urged wealthy citizens to share
their wealth with the community.
118. Id. at 719. Steinway moved the location of its business from New York City to Astoria,
New York, when the corporation needed a new facility. To facilitate the move, Steinway
bought 400 acres of land in Astoria and tried to attract the skilled craftsmen required to
manufacture pianos by building churches, schools, and recreational facilities. Id.
119. Id. at 722.
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fiduciary duty to the shareholders.20 The court dismissed the suit,
holding that the charitable acts directly benefited the corporation and
therefore were not violations of the directors' fiduciary duties to the
shareholders.'
The court found that the contributions to the town had fostered
positive labor and community relations, nurtured a productive labor force,
and thus foreclosed any labor difficulties or strikes.1 2 The court further
found that donating the instruments for "charitable purposes... was
done... in the expectation that the reputation of the Steinway piano
23
would have wider currency and its sale be thereby increased."
Ultimately, Steinway convinced the court that the company's "profitable
expansion," steadily increasing dividends, and profit from the appreciation
of Astoria real estate holdings evidenced the success of the donations and
the directors' good business judgment' 24
Visibly absent from Steinway, however, was any indication of a
noneconomic commitment to the community. The court simply held that
acting in a charitable fashion was good for business. Whether the court's
analysis was as calculated and bottom-line oriented as the opinion suggests
is debatable. The case does, however, illustrate the traditionally narrow
application of the direct corporate benefit doctrine.
For the most part, courts initially applied the exception restrictively
and were not inclined to readily find that corporate donations yielded
direct benefits. In Worthington v. Worthington,'2 a case from the same era
as Steinway, the court disallowed a corporate charitable contribution due to
lack of a direct corporate benefiL'
In Worthington, a hydraulics
manufacturer donated more than $12,000 worth of equipment to furnish
an engineering laboratory at Columbia University.Yn The laboratory
boasted the name of the corporation's founder, who also happened to be
the father of the corporation's president1 2 8 Minority shareholders
brought suit alleging that in making the gift the directors had violated
their fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders.1 2 The court agreed,
holding that the president of the corporation had taken the corporation's
property without paying for it."
Although the two courts applied the same basic analysis, Worthingtonis
distinguishable from Steinway on one important ground: Worthington's gift

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 718.
Id. at 720-21.
Steinway, 40 N.Y.S. at 719-21.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 724.
91 N.Y.S. 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 444.
Worthington, 91 N.Y.S. at 445-46.
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to the university was personal rather than charitable. Because Worthington
meant to honor the father of the corporation's president, the company
essentially made the gift to a pet charity. Moreover, the corporation could
expect no potential economic benefit as a result of the gift. Had the
corporation reasonably expected some benefit, the court probably would
have allowed the donation. If, for example, the corporation donated the
equipment in order to facilitate research in a joint venture with the
university, the corporation could have argued that, although the gift
happened to be charitable, it conferred a direct economic benefit on the
corporation's research program.
Rigorous application of the direct corporate benefit doctrine began to
wane as surplus social wealth became increasingly concentrated in the
corporate sphere.' By the 1950s, courts regularly upheld corporate
charitable behavior under a relaxed direct benefit standard. These courts
justified their increasing tolerance for corporate charity by emphasizing the
importance of corporate wealth to the United States economy. In Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees, 2 the Utah Supreme Court justified a
railroad corporation's gift to a charitable foundation because the gift
conferred a direct benefit on the corporation!" The court likened the
gift to Union Pacific's actions in donating supplies and money to the
victims of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, which the court previously
had held as a benefit to the corporation and, therefore, an act of
charitable giving.TM Although the court conceded that in neither instance
did the corporation receive any immediate benefit, in both cases the value
of the goodwill created by the corporation's actions was "priceless.""'
The court cited the traditional direct corporate benefit language used
by the Steinway court in defending corporate gifts that benefit the
corporation, but its reasoning betrays the fiction underlying the concept.
The court began by reciting a litany of statements made by corporate
officials who testified that to their honest beliefs that the gift to the
foundation benefited shareholders.'M The gifts, the officers asserted,
created goodwill toward the corporation, which resulted in increased
profitability. Accepting these declarations uncritically, the court belied its
purported reliance on the direct benefit doctrine:
Why was the contribution made? We believe that if it were made
with the studied and not unreasonableconviction that it would benefit
the corporation, it should be the type of thing that should rest
131. See 6A Fletcher, supra note 83, § 2939, at 747 ("Direct corporate benefit is no longer
necessary, but corporate interest remains as a motive.").
132. 329 P.2d 398 (Utah 1958).
133. Id. at 401.
134. Id. at 400. In 1906, in response to the great San Francisco earthquake, the Union
Pacific Railroad shipped 1600 train carloads of food and materials to San Francisco, donated
$200,000, and evacuated over 250,000 people.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 401.
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15
to shareholders had such funds remained unspent.
The term "not unreasonable" and the court's qualification of "any
immediate and direct corporate benefit' suggest that the court lowered the
standard for permissible corporate contributions. According to the court's
example, the subsidized scholars need not produce any immediate direct
benefit to the corporation as long as the corporation does not
unreasonably believe that some benefit might ultimately accrue. This
standard legitimizes even those activities that are obviously too diffuse to
increase the corporation's profits. For example, giving art to a museum
arguably may increase productivity among workers who happen to see it
and become inspired by it. To say, however, that the gift benefits the
shareholders as much as distributing the same money in a dividend seems
unreasonable." 8
The court's reasoning in two other parts of Union Pacdfic more dearly

explains the assumptions underlying its reasonableness standard. First, the
court noted that previous cases had allowed corporations to deduct
charitable gifts as business expenses, evidencing a public policy in favor of
corporate charitable giving.' 9 Second, the court emphasized that
corporations had acquired much of the social wealth historically controlled
by individuals.'4 The court consequently noted the need to rely upon

137. Union Pa=., 329 P.2d at 401-02 (emphasis added).

138. Such a gift more dosely resembles a single company which expends funds to limit its
pollution. The company marginally improves the environment as well as society's ability to
sustain long-term economic growth. Unless the corporation itself produces a disproportionate
amount of pollution, however, it will require the cooperation of other polluters to improve
environmental quality enough to sustain long-term growth and profitability. Without the
cooperation of others, the corporation's efforts are of marginal benefit to it as well as the
community. Although they may make everyone's life a little better, they are unlikely to
produce a sufficient marginal increase to make a difference in the profitability of that
particular corporation, especially since its competitors may gain an advantage by not making
similarly expensive environmental improvements. In this hypothetical, the incentive for the
competitor not to make similar improvements actually exists. Like the prisoner's dilemma, this
situation requires external coercion to make certain activity more likely. Perhaps in the case
of charitable giving, public and consumer sentiment provides the "coercive" force which
prevents charitable giving from creating a competitive disadvantage. For a discussion of game
theory applied to environmental management, see Arun S. Malik, Permanent Versus Interim
Regulations: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 22J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt 127, 127-39; Alexander S.
Kritikos, Environmental Policy Under Imperfect Information: Comment, 25 J. Envtl. Econ. &
Mgmt. 89, 89-91.
139. Union Pat-, 329 P.2d at 400 ("In 1935 Congress encouraged corporate contributions
to eleemosynary causes by allowing a deduction for tax purposes in such cases."). For a
discussion ofjudicial treatment of the direct benefit doctrine in the context of tax deductions
for charitable contributions, see infra Part III.
140.
Increasing tax burdens pretty much have relegated large personal fortunes to
an almost forgotten era. Many endowment rivers that yesteryear coursed into private
education, charitable and religious institutions have become but trickles, portending
a thinning of the ranks of top business executives, most of whom were recruited
from private institutions. Such dessication initiated new calls upon industry and
hence upon the business corporation, as a means of securing funds to perpetuate

CHARITABLE CORPORATE GIVING
"the new concept of corporate responsibility" if society was to maintain the
4
Thus, despite the
level of charitable giving it had come to expect.1'
the gift's broader
was
it
assertion that the gift benefited the corporation,
42
societal benefit that actually swayed the court.
In Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Products Co.,'4 another

example of the relaxed direct benefit approach, a food wholesaling
corporation's president, and majority shareholder, pledged $5,000 on the
4
corporation's behalf to a local hospital's capital campaign.' Perhaps

almost forgotten era. Many endowment rivers that yesteryear coursed into private
education, charitable and religious institutions have become but trickles, portending
a thinning of the ranks of top business executives, most of whom were recruited
from private institutions. Such dessication initiated new calls upon industry and
hence upon the business corporation as a means of securing funds to perpetuate
these private institutions.
Union Pacfyi, 329 P.2d at 400.

141. Id. at 401.
142. Id. at 401-02. Importantly, "corporate responsibility," as the court used the term,
differs greatly from the direct corporate benefit that Friedman would require. The court's
understanding of corporate responsibility may also be something more altruistic than the
unofficial bargain that commentators, like Kenneth Dayton, believe to exist between the
public and corporations. Smith, supra note 72, at 121. One can interpret Dayton's comments
to mean that corporate charitable giving is a quid pro quo for corporate existence, not an
altruistic expression of regard for the community.
The language in Union Pacif suggests that corporations should take an active part in
the community's well-being because they are citizens of that community. Corporate
responsibility, however, is absolutely and completely irrelevant to the notion of direct
corporate benefit. The concept of direct corporate benefit suggests that corporations make
gifts only to promote their economic interests. Corporate responsibility, in contrast, suggests
that corporations make sacrifices for the greater good of the community. It is, moreover,
conceptually inconsistent with Friedman's corporate model to state that a corporation, an
artificial body which exists as a separate legal person only to protect its owners from liability,
has any responsibility apart from maximizing profits for its owners. The court's opinion is thus
schizophrenic and difficult to reconcile. Although one can reasonably accept either the direct
benefit model or the corporate responsibility model, one cannot accept both.
It is interesting to note that Dayton's and Friedman's disagreement turns on a rather
fundamental assumption about corporate law, an assumption which is also fundamental in
philosophy. Although Dayton and Friedman both agreed that a corporation is artificial,
Dayton argued that the corporation must give to the community both because of its artifice
and its legal fragility. In contrast, Friedman argued that the corporation cannot give to the
community precisely because it is artifical and that such decisions rightfully belong to the
shareholders as owners.
Dayton's approach is ontological or utilitarian. He argued that the whole is a thing unto
itself. Friedman's approach is a rights-based, deontological model which suggests that the
whole is nothing more than the amalgamation of its individual components. For a discussion
of the philosophical foundation of this distinction, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 27-33
(1971).
143. 290 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1955).
144. Id at 483; see also Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). In
Schlensky, minority shareholders brought suit against the Chicago Cubs baseball organization
to force the club to install lights at Wrigley Field so that the Cubs could play night games
which would draw larger crowds. The court held that the team had valid business reasons for
limiting its schedule to day games and dismissed the shareholder suit. Id. at 780-81. People
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corporation's president later refused to make the payment"1 The trial
court ordered the corporation to complete payment of its pledge and the
California Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the trend on the part of
the prosperous business concern is steadily in the direction of
making substantial charitable contributions in the community in
which it is located and does business. Such donations are
generally considered for its benefit as a means of increasing good
will and promoting patronage.... [A]ppellant, operating its
industrial plant within the community, would be directly
benefited by having such a hospital capable of furnishing needed
hospital services to its employees ....
The court ostensibly based its decision on the doctrine of direct
corporate benefit However, a wholesaler in a market as competitive as
agriculture likely would not derive any benefit from its association with a
charitable activity."' The small corporation, moreover, effectively would
have taken a free-ride on the contributions that others made to the
hospital. Thus, the corporation would likely derive the same benefit from
the hospital's existence whether or not the corporation made any
contributions.""
Of all the decisions in this area, A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v.
Barlowe149 represents the seminal case recognizing a common-law right of
The A.P. Smith
corporations to make charitable contributions.5
Company, a manufacturer of fire hydrants and valves, made a $1,500 gift to

145. The president did not consult his board of directors prior to making the pledge.
Memoial Hos., 290 P.2d at 482.

146. Id.
147. Not only is agriculture the prototypical competitive market, but wholesalers usually
concern themselves more with their own profitability and are less concerned with community
welfare issues than either consumers or retailers who deal directly with socially interested
consumers.
148. At the very least, the court's dedaration that the gift directly benefited the
corporation was sufficiently novel to merit some further exegesis. If the court was serious
about its approach, it should have demonstrated, in specific terms, how it expected the
corporation to benefit. Yet, the court's lack of rigorous analysis of any direct benefit is
consistent with the time's emerging recognition that public purposes may require access to
private wealth. Thus, the court's approach is not altogether surprising. Perhaps the lesson is
that instead of rigorously scrutinizing corporate charitable gifts that benefit society, courts
should adopt an interpretive canon which construes both law and fact in favor of public
benefit. For futher commentary on this matter, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 1007, 1032-34 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Is Caroen Produds Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CaLL. Rev. 686, 691-92
(1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L.
Rev. 873, 908 (1987).
149. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
150. Id at 582. Although NewJersey had a charitable giving statute at the time the case
was litigated, the statute explicitly stated that it did not apply to corporations chartered prior
to its enactment.
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Princeton University."' Shareholders questioned whether the gift was in
the best interest of the corporation and the directors sought a declaratory
judgment confirming the right to make the gift.5 2 The New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the gift.' As in Union Paczfw, the court noted
that Congress and individual states had changed the applicable tax laws to
encourage corporate charitable giving and that the redistribution of wealth
from individuals to corporations had hurt the fund-raising efforts of
charitable organizations. The court stated:
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of
individuals they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by
donating freely for charitable purposes. With the transfer of most
of the wealth to corporate hands and the imposition of heavy
burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to keep
pace with increased philanthropic needs.... Corporations have
come to recognize this and with their enlightenment have sought
in varying measures, as has the plaintiff by its contribution, to
insure and strengthen the society which gives them existence and
the means of aiding themselves and their fellow citizens.1m
The court went on to adopt the concept of corporate responsibility as an
independent reason for permitting corporations to make charitable
contributions. Although the effect of the decision was limited in those
states that already had changed the common law by statute, the court's
recognition of the need for corporate contributions is particularly
noteworthy because the court based it on common-law principles. Perhaps,
most importantly, this decision provides the means to reinterpret the
corporate charitable giving cases by relying upon this new corporate
responsibility hermeneutic.
IV. THE CREATION OF THE DIRECT BENEFIT TEST FOR INCOME TAX
PURPOSES AND THE CONSEQUENT INVERSION OF THE DIRECT BENEFIT TEST
FOR FIDUCIARY PURPOSES

To this point, this Article has argued that as structural economic
changes transferred accumulated wealth from individuals to corporations,
courts applied the direct benefit test in the corporate context less
rigorously to encourage the use of private wealth for public purposes. This
section argues that over roughly the same period, courts developed an

151. Id. at 582.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 585-86, 590. The court continued.
Clearly then, the appellants, as individual stockholders whose private interests rest
entirely upon the well-being of the plaintiff corporation, ought not be permitted to
close their eyes to present-day realities and thwart the long-visioned corporate action

in recognizing and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a constituent of our
modem social structure.
Id. at 590.
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rigorously to encourage the use of private wealth for public purposes. This
section argues that over roughly the same period, courts developed an
analogous test in the corporate income tax context. Pursuant to this test,
courts questioned whether corporations benefited from gifts made to
charitable organizations in determining whether the corporations could
properly deduct the gift from gross income.
The concept of direct corporate benefit had very different beginnings
and applications in the corporate charitable giving context than in the
corporate income tax context. Instead of subtly evolving over a fifty-year
period based upon the facts of particular cases as the corporate charitable
giving cases did, the tax laws changed dramatically when states began to
allow corporations to make charitable contributions.
To maximize charitable giving, courts and legislatures have inverted
the law regarding tax deductibility and charitable donations. Under the
common law of corporate charitable giving, a corporation could
legitimately make a gift and take a tax deduction only if the gift directly
benefited the corporation. Current tax law, however, defines a taxdeductible charitable contribution as one that does not directly benefit the
corporation. The differing treatment of a particular gift over time,
coinciding with the legitimization of corporate giving, provides strong
evidence that earlier courts stretched the common law to encourage the
transfer of resources from private corporations to public purposes.
A. Deductibility of Corporate CharitableContributions Under the Common
Law: The Direct Benefit Rule
Since 1917, the IRS has allowed individuals to deduct charitable
contributions from gross income. 5 Prior to 1935, however, corporations
were not entitled to deduct from gross income contributions or gifts.'I
Nevertheless, beginning in the 1930s, courts began creatively applying the
direct benefit doctrine in taxation cases to encourage corporate charitable
behavior. One approach allowed corporations to take charitable
contributions as business-expense deductions. As long as the contributions
directly benefited the corporation, the corporation could deduct
contributions that also happened to benefit society. Moreover, as in the
charitable gift context, to facilitate public access to private wealth, courts
defined "direct benefit" loosely enough to permit corporations to make
charitable gifts that only minimally benefited the corporation. 5
The court's analysis in Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co.Y provides a
good example of this suspect approach. In 1928, the Minnesota Tribune
155. See, Bliss v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1934); 3 Randolph E. Paul &Jacob
Mertens, Jr., The Law of Federal Income Tax § 29.01 (1934).
156. 3 Paul & Mertens, supra note 155, § 29.08 (Supp. 1937).
157. Id. Sew also supra notes 4044 (discussing the separation of ownership and control of

the corporate form).
158.

103 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1939).
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corporation donated $208.32 to Minnesota College as part of a capital
campaign to retire a $35,000 debt.' The corporation subsequently
deducted the gift from its gross income as a business expense.' The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue brought suit seeking to disallow the
deduction on the grounds that charitable contributions were illegal and
1
not deductible from gross income.'
The corporation convinced the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that
the corporation made the donation to help the college survive, 6 which
enabled the college to continue to advertise in the corporation's
newspaper.
The court concluded that the corporation had benefited
directly from the contribution and that the conveyance was deductible
from gross income as a business expenseee The court summarily rejected
the Commissioner's contention that the benefits to the corporation were
too remote to justify the deduction'65
The court's conclusion-that the $200 contribution helped the
college to survive-is problematic. To persuasively make that argument, the
court would have had to demonstrate that other gifts were dependent
upon the corporation's gift. Even if the newspaper had organized the
capital campaign and other contributions were contingent upon the
corporation's financial leadership, however, whether the newspaper's
advertising profits from an ailing educational institution would ever exceed
the $200 gift is unclear. In any case, the court did not consider the matter
important enough to ascertain the present value of the contribution and
balance it against the expected future stream of advertising revenue. Either
the court overlooked this rather obvious point, which seems unlikely, or
the case illustrates ajudicial willingness to tap corporate coffers for socially
beneficial causes.
Similarly, in American Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner of Internal

159. Id. at 952.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Minnesota College is no longer in existence.
163. Willt 103 F.2d at 952.
164. Id.
To keep [Minnesota College] in business served to maintain a source of annual
advertising income and thus directly benefited the corporation and its shareholders.
Such being the fact the expenditure was in consideration of a "benefit flowing
directly to the corporation as an incident to its business" and was properly
deductible.
Id. (quoting trial court opinion).
165. Id. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Willcuts represented a break from recent
precedent decided in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which had reached a different result
two years prior on very similar facts. See also Fairmont Creamery Corp. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d
810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1937). In Fairmont Creanmy, the D.C, Circuit held that donations to the
Y.M.C.A. and Briar.Cliff College directly benefited the corporation and were deductible from
gross income. The court held that each donation allowed the company to retain the donee's
business. Id. at 813.
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Revenue,1 6 the Sixth Circuit addressed the tax deductibility of a charitable

contribution as a business expense. The American Rolling Mill corporation
claimed tax deductions for $360,000 in contributions to a "civic
improvement fund" established by the city in which the corporation
manufactured sheet metal and steel.' 67 The civic improvement fund
ultimately distributed the contributions to the Board of Education, the Girl
Scouts, the Y.M.C.A., the Parks Commission, the City Hospital, and similar
charities." American Rolling Mill -argued that the contributions were
deductible as a general business expense under section 234(a) (1) of the
Revenue Act of 1918169 because the- contributions encouraged employees
to remain in the community and discouraged strikes.'70 The Commissioner argued that the contributions provided no direct benefit to the
corporation and that any measurable benefit was so remote that
recognizing it as a business expense would effecthely allow corporations to
deduct all charitable giving.' 7' The court disagreed with the Commissioner. 2 After balancing "the outlays against the benefits to be reasonably
expected," the court concluded that if the corporation had notjoined with

166.

41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930).

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Section 234(a) (1) provided:
(a) That in computing the net income of a corporation subject to the tax imposed

by section 230 there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered, and including rentals or other payments required to be made as
a condition to the continued use or possession of property to which the
corporation has not taken or is not taking title, or in which it has no

equity....
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1077 (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§ 162(a)(1)&(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).

170.
It is accepted as true in the industrial world that strikes and shifting labor conditions
impair efficiency of production, and that contentment and well-being add to the skill
and productivity of workmen. Acting upon that principle, the large industries of the
country almost without exception have engaged in mutual interest work in one form
or another with their employees, with the view of contributing to their comfort and
pleasures, encouraging them to purchase homes, and giving them such interest in
the community as to make them an asset of the business. Such work has been
considered by the courts as a corporate function having a substantial relation to the
progress and success of the industry.
American RollingMil4 41 F.2d at 315.
171.
It is said for the Commissioner that every legitimate business in a city is more or less
benefited by any civic enterprise, and that to sustain the deduction in the case at bar
would open the door to the deduction of every contribution to any, enterprise that
had for its betterment of the people of the surrounding community.
Id.
172. "We think the [Commissioner's] argument is unsound." Id.
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other civic groups to improve the community, it may have had to provide
similar services for its employees by itself.173
Like the New York Supreme Court in Steinway, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in American Rolling Mill ostensibly based its opinion upon a
direct benefit analysis and concluded that the corporation reaped a greater
benefit from making the charitable gift than it would have from declaring
a dividend to shareholders. Like Steinway, American Rolling Mill involved
skilled laborers in a town dominated by a single employer. As such, the
court's opinion is arguably defensible.'7 4 On the other hand, it is difficult
to believe, that the corporation benefited as much from the contributions
to the community as it would have had it not spread the money so
diffusely. For example, the corporation could have given the money
directly to its employees in the form of higher wages, built an employee
recreation center, provided scholarships for the children of employees, or
improved working conditions at the plant, thereby concentrating its
resources on the well-being of its employees and their families.
It is therefore arguable that the American Rolling Mill court, like the
Willcuts court, did not engage in the type of analysis that it purported to
engage in. Rather, both courts appeared to first justify the gifts as socially
beneficial transfers and then manipulate their decisions to fit within the
existing direct benefit construct. Commentators at the time also speculated
that the court was being less than completely candid:
Despite the persistent refusal of Congress to extend to
corporations the privilege accorded to individuals of deducting
charitable contributions from gross income, the same result has
frequently been accomplished in the case of corporate donations
for the benefit of employees, by cloaking the donations in the
garb of business expenses."
In sum, American Rolling Mill was "in reality a subterfuge for subverting the
policy of Congress," which did not allow corporations to deduct charitable
contributions. 7"
173. Id. In its balancing analysis, the court suggested that "the nature and size of the
industry, its location, the number of its employees... and what other employers similarly
situated are doing" would be factors relevant to the direct benefit analysis. Id.
174. One later court distinguished American Rolling Mil based upon that corporation's

dominance in a small community. Morgan Const. Co. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 892, 893
(D. Mass. 1937). In Morgan, a corporation argued that its gifts to the local chapter of the
Y.M.C.A. created a direct benefit to the corporation under American Rolling Mill The court
disagreed:

The court [in American Rolling Mill] was plainly influenced by the fact that plaintiff
employed half the community's wage earning population and contributed 36 per
cent. of the total civic funds raised in the community. In the instant case, petitioner
employs about 750 persons out of a population of 195,000 and contributed less than
1 per cent. of the total... funds.

Id.
175.
176.

Recent Decisions, 30 Colum. L Rev. 1211, 1211 (1930).
Id. at 1212.
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B. Deductibility of CorporateCharitableContributions Under the Tax
Code: Inverting the Direct Benefit Rule
In 1935, Congress passed legislation allowing corporations to deduct
charitable contributions from gross income.'77 Under the legislation,
corporations could deduct charitable contributions in an amount up to five
percent of their gross income regardless of whether the contribution
directly benefited the corporation." s The legislation also clarified that
contributions from which the corporation benefited were still deductible as
business expenses.79
When the states began to pass laws in the 1950s allowing corporate
charitable contributions, however, the United States Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Duberstein,O held that a corporation could not take gifts
as charitable deductions so long as the gift stemmed from "the
constraining force of any moral or legal duty" or, significantly, from the
"incentive of anticipated benefit." 8' Instead of using the direct benefit
test to allow corporations to deduct only those gifts which directly
benefited the corporation as earlier courts did, the Supreme Court
inverted the test and allowed corporations to deduct only those gifts that
did not directly benefit the corporation.8 2 The Court's Duberstein analysis
has persisted, and under present law a taxpayer must establish that a
claimed charitable contribution proceeded from the taxpayer's "detached
and disinterested generosity." 183 The difference between the two direct
benefit tests is ostensibly dramatic, but explainable by courts' collective
desire to maximize the availability of private resources for public use.
In Singer Co. v. United States,'" the court's reasoning reflected a
similar utilitarian approach. In Singer Co., the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that a sewing machine company's sales of sewing
machines to junior and senior high schools at a discount were not
charitable contributions."' The court conceded that the benefits to the
corporation's public image and goodwill alone did not confer a sufficient
177. 3 Paul & Mertens,
178. Id.

supra note 155, § 29.08 (Supp. 1937).

179. Id. The provision, thus, effectively allowed corporations to make charitable
contributions in excess of the five percent limit under some circumstances.
180.

363 U.S. 278 (1960).

181.

Id. at 285.

182.

Id.

183. Id. See ahso United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968)
(holding that an indirect business advantage which coincides with public advantage does not
disqualify a transfer as a charitable contribution, although a direct benefit does); Dejong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 377-79 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Duberstdn test to individual
taxpayer's payments to private school in "charitable contribution" language); Michael D. Rose
&John C. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation § 11.19, at 665 n.3 (3d ed. 1988).
184. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. CL. 1971).
185. Id. at 423-24.
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benefit to disqualify the discounts as charitable contributions. 86 Rather,
the court characterized the discounts as a marketing program through
which the corporation hoped to benefit by acquainting potential
consumers with their product: "[T]he benefits to be derived from such
discounts were substantial enough to... [provide Singer] with a quid pro
quo."' o The court concluded that the discounts were not charitable in
nature and it did not allow Singer to deduct the discounts from gross
income'8 8 In effect, the court's decision allowed the taxpayers supporting
the relevant school districts to enjoy the discounts without depriving the
federal treasury of income.
Similarly, in Foster v. Commissioner," the United States Tax Court
held that a gift that benefits the donor is not deductible from gross
income. In Foster, the court disallowed a land developer's charitable
deductions for gifts of land to a city because the developer's partnership
directly benefited from the grant.190 Foster and his three sons formed a
partnership to develop a 2,600 acre tract of land twelve miles south of San
Francisco, California. '9 ' The partnership gave three parcels of land to the
city for park development.1 9 The court held that the partnership made
the conveyance with an "expectation of a direct economic benefit" and
disallowed the charitable deduction.'93 As in Singer, the Foster court

186. Id. at 423.
187. Id. at 414.
188. Id. at 424. See also Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972)
(determining that payments to a parochial school for an education fund do not constitute
charitable contributions when the corporation anticipates an economic benefit). But seeAllen
v. United States, 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976). In Allen, a local zoning ordinance required a
developer to set aside a certain amount of land for open space if the developer built one-half
acre lots. Id. at 787. In an attempt to get approval for a 22-acre development of one-half acre
lots, the taxpayer donated nine acres of land to the city for use as open space and took a
charitable deduction. Id. The trial court allowed the deduction and the Commissioner
appealed. Id.
The Ninth Circuit applied the Duberstein test, but held that motive and purpose are
questions of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. Id. at 787-88. The court thus affirmed the trial
court decision and allowed the deduction. Judge Williams, however, dissented, observing that
because the developer's primary motivation was to gain zoning approval, the gift was not at all
disinterested. Id. at 789.
189. 80 T.C. 34 (1984).
190. Id. at 40.
191. Id. at 47.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 60-71. The court believed that the partnership conveyed the property in order
to enhance the value of its remaining land and promote its sale. Id. at 111-12. See also United
States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 US. 105, 118 (1986) ("The sine quo qua non of a
charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration.");
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting that taxpayer's primary
ptirpose must be to assist charity and not to secure personal benefit); Stubbs v. United States,
428 F.2d 885, 886-88 (9th Cir. 1970) (determining that taxpayer's dedication as public
property of land abutting taxpayer's property was not for charitable purpose because of
specific and direct economic benefit).
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established thfit a person cannot take a charitable deduction, which would
deprive the federal treasury of tax income, when the person made the
contribution solely in economic self-interest. Foster, therefore, maximized
the amount of private resources available for public use: San Francisco
received the
parks and the United States Treasury received greater tax
4
revenue.1
The Federal Circuit's ruling in Transamerica Corp. v. United States'95
provides a more recent example ofjudicial denial of a tax deduction due
to the donor's economically self-interested actions. In Transamerica, the
plaintiff-corporation claimed a charitable deduction for the value of
nitrate-based film stock it donated to the Library of Congress. The nitratebased film was fragile, potentially explosive, and required tranferring to
safety film at considerable expense to the Library. The taxpayer's
"Instrument of Gift," however, retained exclusive rights to the use and title
of the product so that the taxpayer continued to enjoy the use of the film
without incurring the expense necessary to preserve its utility. The court
held that the taxpayer received something of more than nominal value in
exchange for its contribution and disallowed the deduction. 99 By
denying the deduction, the court's judgment guaranteed that
the public
1
received both the benefit of the gift and the taxes collected. 7
Given this jurisprudential shift, it is obvious that although at one time
deemed to directly benefit its donor, the same gift would not disqualify the
corporation from taking a deduction for the identical gift under the
current tax code. For example, the A.P. Smith Corporation's gift to
Princeton University, originally upheld under the direct benefit doctrine,
would nonetheless qualify for a tax deduction today because the court
would not consider it as directly benefiting the corporation under current
tax analysis. The court would find mere public relations value of the
donation insufficient to confer a direct benefit under Singer 9 s Thus, the
same gift would still be deductible today, but for different reasons.

194. The Federal Circuit encountered the same fact situation in Ottawa Silica Co. v.
United States, 699 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Ottawa Silica, a taxpayer sought a deduction
for land it donated to the state for the construction of a school. The Federal Circuit held that
the taxpayer derived a direct economic benefit from the donation-an increase in the value
of his remaining land. Hence, the taxpayer received a quid pro quo and was not entitled to a
charitable deduction. Id. at 1132.
195. 902 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
196. Id. at 1545.
197. One major exception to the Duberstein direct benefit test has developed in litigation
involving nursing homes. Courts have allowed taxpayers to deduct "gifts" to nursing homes
even though the donors likely made the contributions in anticipation of very direct benefits.
Se, ag., Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that gift to
nursing home was charitable); Sedan v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975)
(same); Estate of Wardwell v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632, 638 (8th Car. 1962) (holding that
charitable gift to nursing home is charitable even though donor made it the day before the
donor was admitted).
198. See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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Under the charitable corporate giving paradigm, a corporation's
contribution to charity would be deductible only if it directly benefited the
corporation. Under Duberstein's inverted test, however, it would be
deductible precisely and only because it did not directly benefit the
corporation. Interestingly, the law would consider the same gift to have
directly benefited the corporation under one scheme, but not under the
other.
Similarly, the fact that the gifts in A.P. Smith and Memorial Hospital
Corp. did not confer direct benefits upon their respective corporations
allowed those corporations to take charitable deductions. On the other
hand, if the courts had found a direct benefit to either corporation, that
corporation could have argued that it was entitled to a deduction for a
business expense as in Willcuts.
For purposes of this analysis, consider the legal treatment of two
separate gifts made by a major manufacturing corporation in 1900 and
1970. The first gift is a donation to a university to endow a professorship in
the engineering department. The second gift is a piece of real estate to the
municipality pursuant to zoning restrictions involved in the construction of
a new plant. In 1900, corporate law allowed both gifts because it
considered both to directly benefit the corporation. The gift to the
engineering department would have directly benefited the corporation
because students who might some day work for the corporation would
receive better instruction and another faculty member would have had the
resources to conduct potentially beneficial research. The second gift would
have benefited the corporation by allowing the corporation to build a new
plant. Moreover, both gifts would have been deductible as business
expenses because both benefited the corporation.
By 1970, however, the treatment of the two gifts has diverged.
Although the law still allows both gifts, the analysis of whether and why
they are deductible has changed. The gift to the university is now
deductible as a charitable contribution precisely because the law now
deems it not to directly benefit the corporation. The second gift of land,
however, is still thought to directly benefit the corporation and is therefore
not deductible as a charitable contribution, but is deductible as a business
expense.
The current tax regime would not consider corporate charitable
contributions determined by earlier courts as having directly benefited the
corporation to bestow direct benefits upon those corporations today.
Instead, it would consider them detached and disinterested, and therefore
deductible. The only consistent variable running through these cases and
doctrines is the desire of the public and the courts to use private resources
for public purposes. When a corporation had direct economic reasons to
make a contribution, the relevant community received the full benefit of
the donation and the federal government collected additional tax revenues.
The public benefit derived from any permissible corporate donation was
maximized.
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V. THE DOCTRINE OF DIRECT CORPORATE BENEFIT AND PENSION FUNDS

A. The Doctrine of Direct CorporateBenefit as a Fluid Fiction to Encourage

CharitableCorporateBehavior
The shift in jurisprudence in the charitable donation and deduction
cases represents a fundamental change in the role of direct benefit
doctrine in the corporate charitable giving context. Under the former
regime, corporations could make charitable contributions, then deduct
them as business expenses so long as the corporation received even a
remote benefit from the donation. Under the new regime, however, when
a corporation benefits as the result of a gift, the law considers the transfer
noncharitable and therefore nondeductible.
Recognizing society's desire to accommodate shifts in the
concentration of surplus social wealth best reconciles the two regimes.
Initially under the former regime, courts narrowly construed the direct
benefit test and restricted the permissible scope of corporate giving
because individual philanthropists who controlled the vast bulk of the
nation's wealth could satisfy society's charitable needs. As wealth began to
accumulate in corporations, however, courts had to broadly define
"direct benefit" to allow charitable gifts and preserve the level of charitable
giving to which society had become accustomed. Under the new regime,
which legitimizes deductions for corporate charitable contributions under
the Tax Code,2 ° courts sought to maximize governmental revenues by
defining charitable gifts as those not primarily benefiting the donor.
Together, the two schemes result in the public use of private wealth
21
by maximizing

tax revenue

and

encouraging

charitable

giving.

Interestingly, this evolving approach reflects the tension between the
Friedman and Dayton world views. Rational individual shareholders want to
maximize their return, control, and autonomy over their investments. On
the other hand, society wants to maximize its benefits from private capital
and will tolerate corporations and corporate profits only as long as
sufficient surplus wealth exists to make side payments, in the form of
charitable contributions, to the public. An evolution of charitable giving
law to balance these conflicting interests and divide the benefits of
accumulated wealth is the type of social change expected from a wellorganized, thoughtful, populist movement. At some level, therefore,
expectations of corporate giving and the continuing existence of the
199. Fletcher, supra note 83, § 2938, at 743.
200. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1990). See generally KennethJ. Yerkes, Note, Corporate Charitable
Contributions: Expanding the Judicial Analysis in a Post-Economic Recovery Act World, 58
Ind. L.J. 161 (YEAR) (discussing charitable corporate contributions).
201. Economist Martin Feldstein has argued that charitable deductions are an efficient
means of encouraging giving for public purposes because society benefits more from the gift

to charity than it loses through lost revenue. Michael J. Graetz, Federal Income Taxation 479
(2d ed. 1988).
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corporate entity may represent a political bargain between those who
create wealth and the wider group of those who seek to benefit from it.
Professors Langbein and Posner have contended that pension funds
are analogous to the historical model of the corporate form. Echoing
Friedman, they implied that pension funds simply hold the securities of
the same corporations as did the individual investors whose ownership
interests Friedman sought to defend. Their model, however, does not
incorporate the "political bargain" reflected in the corporate model. This
country's legal and judicial institutions have historically encouraged the
use of private resources for public purposes, an approach completely
inconsistent with the strict profit maximization standards that Langbein
and Posner would impose for pension fund fiduciaries. The movement of
wealth from individuals to corporations in the late nineteenth century
prompted courts to expand the scope of permissible charitable corporate
giving. Contemporary society is experiencing a parallel shift of wealth from
individuals and corporations to pension funds. Assuming that society's
need and desire for private wealth has not diminished, allowing pension
fund fiduciaries to engage in socially responsible investing represents a
natural evolutionary step. Thus, the development of the common-law
approach to charitable corporate giving provides a theoretical foundation
and justification for the socially responsible investment of pension funds.
Pension fund beneficiaries, moreover, are distinguishable from
shareholders in a way that makes adherence to the classic legal model of
the corporation inappropriate. Although beneficiaries of a pension fund
technically own a share of the fund, they do not control the securities in
which the fund invests as individual investors can. Unlike a shareholder
who acquires corporate stock voluntarily, pension fund beneficiaries have
no such choice. Even when receiving distributions, the beneficiary recovers
the capital in a limited fashion and over an extended period of time.
Consequently, the enormous social and political potential of capital in this
country's pension funds lies idle, managed in a manner that American
judicial institutions have rejected in the corporate context. 20 2
The reasoning that led individual courts to stretch the direct benefit
doctrine during the first half of the twentieth century provides a sound
foundation for the socially responsible investment of pension funds today.

202. One might argue, however, that individual (noninstitutional) investors and their
representative directors will insure that a company in which the fund has invested will act in a

socially reasonable and charitable manner and that the pension fund thus need not concern
itself with such issues. This position overlooks two important points. First, institutional
investors are such a powerful force in the current economy that they exert enormous control
over particular stocks. In fact, institutional investors have even exerted strong inluence on
corporate affairs at the board of directors level. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 4, at 147982. Second, corporations are not in the best position to evaluate their own activities.
Charitable corporations might make gifts to the community. They are not, however, likely to
disapprove of their particular industry. Moreover, they might not venture outside their
particular business to conduct the types of activities that the community needs and thus may
not satisfy society's desire to utilize positive screens.
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Society allowed corporations to make charitable contributions when it
recognized a depletion in the funds available from individual donors
caused by a structural reallocation of resources. Recognizing the need to
sustain an accustomed level of charitable contributions, courts facilitated
the public's access to the new source of private wealth: corporate coffers.
Similarly, to meet contemporary social concerns about the availability and
proper use of capital, 03 courts should allow pension funds to employ
socially responsible criteria when making investment decisions.2 "
A necessary implication of this analysis is that courts should allow
pension fund fiduciaries to use reasonable social screens in making
investment decisions, just as directors of corporations may make reasonable
charitable contributions. As in Baltimore City, courts should recognize that a
trustee's use of reasonable socially responsible screens does not violate 2the
duty of loyalty, because any infringement upon that duty is de minimis. 15
In sum, the charitable corporate giving cases provide a model for
defining the reasonable financial sacrifices a fund manager may make for
the advancement of other normative considerations. Absent a modem
judicial consensus on the permissible scope of socially responsible
investment, courts can look to these cases for guidance in balancing the
beneficiaries' interests in profit maximization against society's interest in
philanthropy. Moreover, by explicitly adopting this approach now, courts
can ensure that the jurisprudence surrounding socially responsible
investment evolves in a coherent and predictable manner.

203. Society also maintains power over pension funds through various regulations and the
full deductibility from gross income of employer and employee pension contributions. See 26
U.S.C. §§ 401-416, 4971-4980(A), 6662 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
204. The distinction between defined benefit plans, where the employer guarantees the
employee certain benefits over time, and a defined contribution plan, where an employer
establishes a fund for the employee, is an important one. With a defined contribution plan,
the employee properly and appropriately makes a decision after balancing the trade-offs
between possible reductions in return and normative criteria. Similarly, when an employer
makes a decision to invest the assets of a defined benefit plan in a socially responsible
manner, as in Baltimore City, it assumes the responsibility for the economic consequences of its
normative choice. Of course, whether the employer should make such a normative decision
with the assets held in trust for the employee is another matter. One might, for example,
suggest that the employer give the employee some control over the assets just as individuals
have control over the investment of other property.
The more difficult issue, however, is whether an employer offering a defined benefit
plan should be required to invest in a socially responsible manner. If so, who should bear the
risks and make the choices? Although this Article offers no extensive guidance on this issue,
its analysis shows the further desirability of defined contribution plans based upon a
normative analysis and the complexities involved in pension fund investing. One might also
explore whether Congress should change the tax code to give existing tax benefits only to
defined contribution plans. See supra note 203.
205. Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720, 738 (Md. 1989).
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B. Satisfying InvestorPreferences-A Solution
Economic theory indicates that the utility of beneficiaries may actually
be increased if fund managers invest in a socially responsible manner.
Investors have different tastes or preferences as reflected by their
investment decisions.2°' These investment decisions provide satisfaction or
utility to the investor, and when possible, the investor arranges the
decisions to maximize satisfaction and to determine the combination of
goods and services that maximizes investor well-being. Consider the
following assumptions about the preference patterns of investors:
(1) The investor is able to rank different combinations or bundles of
goods in terms of desirability. Suppose an investor is confronted with three
bundles of investments: low risk, low return; moderate risk, moderate
return; and high risk, high return. The investor is able to decide whether
she prefers moderate risk, moderate return or low risk, low return. If an
investor has no preference, then each grouping is essentially viewed as
yielding the same level of utility.
(2) The investor's preferences are transitive. If, for instance, there are
three bundles of goods, X, Y, and Z, and the investor prefers X to Y and Y
to Z, then the investor also will prefer X to Z.
(3) The investor always prefers more to less. All other considerations
being equal, the investor will prefer a higher return over a lesser return.
Indifference curves are easily applied to investors. To understand
indifference curves, first assume that an investor is indifferent among the
various groupings denoted in Table 1.
Table 1
(a)
Stock funds
A:
B:
C:
D:
E:
F:

10
7
5
4
3
2

(b)
Bond funds
1
2
3
4
6
9

Stock funds

Bond funds

13
10
8
7
6
5

2
3
4
5
7
10

That is, assume the investor who desires a diversified portfolio finds equally
desirable an investment portfolio mix consisting of ten stock mutual funds
206. The general indifference curve analysis informs much of the general conceptual
framework for this section. Edgar K.Browning &Jacquelene M. Browning, Public Finance and
the Price System 485-505 (2d ed. 1983).
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and one bond mutual fund, or seven stock mutual funds and two bond
mutual funds, and so on. In turn, assume that each combination in Table
1(b) is as desirable as any other. Significantly, however, note that more
stock mutual funds are provided in (b) than in (a). Accordingly, the
investor will prefer any combination in (b) over any in (a).
Points on indifference curves represent alternative bundles of
investments. In other words, an indifference curve is a locus of points
indicating different combinations of goods that yield the consumer the
same level of satisfaction. In Figure 1, indifference curve U represents the
alternative combinations of stock and bond mutual fimds detailed in Table
1 (a). Stock mutual funds are measured on the vertical a-is and bond
mutual funds on the horizontal axis. Thus, a point such as W represents a
holding of a portfolio of ten stock mutual funds and one bond mutual
fund. Significantly, the investor is equally well off consuming any
combination of goods shown on U1.
Two characteristics of indifference curves are particularly noteworthy.
First, indifference curves are convex, and usually fairly steep at the top and
more markedly flat at the bottom. This shape is a function of the relative
importance of the two goods to the investor. At the top of the curve, the
investor has a substantial number of stock mutual funds and very few bond
mutual funds. To move from point W to point X (where there are fewer
stock funds and more bond funds), the investor would be willing to give
up three stock funds for an additional bond fund. As the investor moves
down the curve, however, the situation changes. The investor has more
bond funds and fewer stock funds and is consequently less willing to trade
stock for bond funds. The rate at which the investor trades these funds for
one another is the marginal rate of substitution, which is evidenced in
Figure I by the slope of the indifference curve.
Second, indifference curves that lie farther from the origin represent
higher levels of utility than those closer to the origin. Recall Table 1(b).
With all of the levels of stock funds owned, more bond funds are provided
than in Table 1(a). The indifference curve U, in Figure I represents this
combination of investments. Curve U, lies farther from the origin than U
and, accordingly, represents a higher level of utility.
This second characteristic of indifference curve analysis is profoundly
significant. Since higher indifference curves correspond to higher levels of
well-being, a rational utility-maximizing investor will want to achieve the
highest indifference curve possible. However, the investor faces an
important limitation. Her total level of wealth limits her investment or
consumption decisions. These wealth constraints are illustrated by the
investor's wealth constraints line in Figure 2.
The creation of an investor's wealth constraint line is relatively
straightforward. Assume that an investor has a total of $10,000 to invest
and that the investor can purchase either of the two types of funds. To
illustrate this concept more fully, also assume that regulatory requirements
mandate the purchase of stock mutual fund shares in $1,000 umits and the
purchase of bond mutual fund shares in $500 units. Thus, if the investor
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invested all of her money in stock mutual funds, she could purchase ten
units, and if she invested all of her money in bond mutual funds she could
purchase twenty units. In Figure 2, the straight line SB, which connects ten
units of stock mutual funds and twenty units of bond mutual funds, defines
the investor's budget, or wealth line. The wealth line shows all
combinations or quantities of stock and bond funds that the investor can
purchase.
The position of the wealth line depends upon the size of the budget
If the investor's wealth increases, the wealth line moves farther from the
origin; if the investor's wealth declines, the wealth line moves closer to the
origin. Figure 2 illustrates these effects. As noted above, line SB denotes
the initial wealth line. Suppose now the total wealth of the investor
increases to $15,000. A line connecting 15S and 30B (SB') now defines a
new wealth line. Similarly, if income falls to $5,000, another wealth line will
join 5S and 10B. Note that these three wealth lines are parallel. The lack
of change in S's and B's prices indicates that the slopes of all three wealth
lines are the same.
In addition to income changes, changes in the unit price of the funds
also affect the wealth line. To illustrate, assume that purchasing bond
mutual funds in $250-per-unit increments becomes possible. To reflect this
change, the wealth line will rotate to SB1. Point S remains the same
because the investors still can purchase only ten stock mutual fund units.
Now, however, by investing everything in bond mutual funds, the investor
can purchase forty bond mutual fund units. Figure 3 illustrates this effect.
The investor's budget line denotes the combination of investments
available to the investor, and the indifference curves show how the investor
subjectively ranks all combinations of investments. In Figure 4, the
indifference curves U, through Us reflect the investor's preferences. Curve
Us is most preferable because it represents the highest level of utility. The
budget line SB represents a real investment possibility. Any point along SB
(or below it) represents an investment possibility. Points above the wealth
line are not feasible investments because the investor lacks the requisite
wealth to make those investments. Because investors will seek the highest
level of well-being possible given their wealth, equilibrium will occur at
Thus, the
point B1 where the wealth line and U2 are tangent.
combination of S and B' represented by the tangency of point B is the
equilibrium level of consumption for the investor.
Continuing to assume that it is possible to purchase bond mutual
funds in $250-per-unit increments, the regulatory change will affect the
investor in two ways: a wealth effect and a substitution effect The wealth
effect occurs because the investor's wealth now goes further as a result of

1
207. Note that although the wealth line includes point A, B 's position on a higher
indifference curve, U, makes it preferable to point A. The investor rules out point D because,
despite falling within the investor's budget, it has a lower indifference curve and therefore is
not the highest possible level of well-being attainable by the investor.
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the regulatory change, leaving her better off. The investor can purchase
the same number of bond mutual funds as before and still have wealth left
over to spend on other investments. The regulatory change, in effect,
increases the investor's real wealth. The substitution effect results from the
investor's decision to substitute the now lower priced investment for other
investments. Because bond mutual funds, with their new unit price,
become a relatively more attractive buy, the investor will choose to
purchase more of them in comparison to other investments.
Figure 5 shows the total effect of this regulatory change as the
increase in consumption of B from B, to B2. Line SB represents the
original wealth line, with the investor in equilibrium at E purchasing B1
units of B. The new wealth line SB1 reflects the regulatory change just
discussed. The change involves a new equilibrium for the investor at E' ,
with B2 units of B of being purchased. The total effect of this change, B1B,
is divisable into a wealth and substitution effect. To identify the
substitution effect, the investor's real wealth decreases by an amount
sufficient to return the investor to the original indifference curve U1. To
nullify the wealth effect, a hypothetical wealth line, HH', is then
constructed that is parallel to SB' and tangent to U,. The tangency occurs
atJ. The HH' wealth line must remain parallel to SB to keep the investor
on the original indifference curve with the new price of B to determine
how the lower price of B, isolated from the wealth effect, causes the
investor to increase her consumption of B. The substitution effect is the
difference between the quantity of B consumed at the initial equilibrium E,
with quantity consumed at J. On the horizontal axis, the quantity BBj
represents the increase in consumption associated with the substitution
effect.
To consider the wealth effect, assume that the wealth line HH1 shifts
to the right to coincide with SB1. The vertical distance between HH' and
SB represents the gain in real wealth attributable to the decline in the
price per unit of bond funds. This rise in wealth alone is responsible for
an increase in the purchase of B by the amount of BB 2 because an
increase in real wealth will induce the investor to expand consumption of
all investments.
In the instant context, indifference curve analysis suggests that
permitting plan fiduciaries to engage in socially responsible investing
might actually place plan beneficiaries on higher indifference curves, thus
maximizing their utility. Assume, for example, that pension plan
participants can choose whether their plan fiduciary will engage in socially
responsible investment. Consider Figure 6 below. The vertical axis
measures the purely monetary investment return of the pension plan. The
horizontal axis denotes the social responsibility of the various investment
alternatives. Assume (although as noted above this is subject to factual
dispute) that as the participant's return rises, investment is less socially
responsible and vice-versa. That is, consider the fact that at the current
wealth line RS, the participant will have a choice between a myriad of
alternatives that are either very profitable and not very socially responsible,
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not very profitable and very socially responsible, or some combination in
between. Of course, the combination chosen depends on each participant's
preferences relating to money and social responsibility, as shown by the
indifference curves U1, U, and U. In Figure 6, point E represents the
participant's equilibrium (showing the most preferred combination of
return and acceptance of the investment). Note that at point A the
participant could earn a greater return by concerning herself less with
being socially responsible, but she would then be on a lower indifference
curve.
Posit now the situation suggested by Professors Langbein and Posner
in which an advisor tells a participant she can earn an even greater return
than she currently earns by investing in a manner that virtually ignores
social responsibility. If the rate of return changes, the wealth line rotates
about the horizontal intercept. Figure 7 shows RS as the wealth line with a
10% rate of return in both diagrams. If the rate of return rises to 15%, the
wealth line shifts to R1S. The slope, now greater, shows that for every unit
of social responsibility relinquished, the investment earns a higher return
than before.
How this investor will respond is an interesting question. Professors
Langbein and Posner implied that this scenario reflects reality. Invest in a
socially responsible manner and the return falls accordingly, they
contended. Assuming, arguendo, that they were right, how might a
participant actually respond in this context? Is she really likely to seek the
higher return while ignoring social consequences? Which path of action
places her on a higher indifference curve?
Recall that an increase in the return rate has two effects: a wealth
effect and a substitution effect. The wealth effect is a result of the fact that
the higher rate of return raises the participant's wealth for any investment
made. That is, at a higher rate of return it will lead the participant to
consume more of all goods, including social responsibility. The substitution
effect, on the other hand, encourages participants to seek a higher return
when the possible rate of return rises because the relative cost of
consuming social responsibility increases so the quantity consumed
declines. In short, the participant will sacrifice more as her potential
prospective return increases.
Because these two returns work in opposing directions, it is impossible
to predict whether a participant will seek a higher rate of return in
response to a change in the anticipated rate of return. If the wealth effect
is greater than the substitution effect, then the degree of social
responsibility consumed will increase, as illustrated in Figure 7(a). If the
substitution effect predominates, then the participant will seek a higher
return at the expense of being socially responsible, as illustrated in Figure
7(b). If the two effects exactly offset each other, then the participant's
behavior will not change. Unlike Professors Posner and Langbein, we
cannot assert that individuals necessarily will be better off only if they
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choose investments which lead to a higher rate of return."'

CONCLUSION

The wealth held in large pension plans in the United States is
immense. Traditionally, courts and commentators have held that the
fiduciary duty of pension fund managers is to maximize profits. This
Article proposes a novel justification for the socially responsible investment
of pension funds based upon traditional principles of charitable corporate
giving and populism. As this Article asserts, the justifications employed by
courts in the first half of the twentieth century to expand the doctrine of
direct corporate benefit in the charitable corporate giving context provide
a foundation for allowing socially responsible investing in the pension fund
context. The Article concludes with an explanation of how beneficiaries
may actually be better off if pension funds are allowed to invest in a
socially responsible manner.

208. As an alternative to allowing pension fund fiduciaries to choose what investments are
socially responsible, one might propose a broad, market-based reform permitting individual
beneficiaries to control their pension fund investments. Pursuant to such a scenario,
Individuals might invest their defined contribution in a mutual fund of their choice, much
like a 401(k) plan with a broad range of alternative investment vehicles. Under this system,
the market would respond to shifts in the prevailing moral or ethical consensus and define
plans which represent a broad scope of alternatives, permitting individual beneficiaries to
invest according to their own perceived best interests. Individuals would choose how to invest
their assets based upon their political or normative beliefs or choose to ignore noneconomic
criteria and maximize their returns.
Whether sufficient demand exists for socially responsible pension vehicles is an
empirical question the market would answer. Perhaps hundreds of different funds with
different positive and negative social screens would emerge and provide pension beneficiaries
with a wealth of choices, or perhaps only the existing thirty or so socially responsible mutual
funds would attract a marginally higher percentage of the market. Education would certainly
become an important part of the marketing in this newly created pension or mutual fund
market. In any case, ethical issues would not limit individual workers' choices. This proposal
suggests that individuals could employ whatever criteria they choose in investing their pension
contributions.
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